



Consideration and the Formation Defenses 
Val Ricks* 
 
The common law defenses to contract formation—duress, 
misrepresentation or fraud, mistake, and unconscionability—are best 
justified historically, doctrinally, logically, and from the standpoint of 
policy, as a response to the plaintiff’s showing of consideration.  The 
next-best alternative, assent, justifies too little. 
This thesis is proved in two parts.  Part I addresses doctrinal history.  
The defenses existed in the law long before assent became part of the 
doctrine.  When the defenses developed, consideration was with promise 
the primary touchstone of contractual liability.  The formation defenses 
were often formulated explicitly with reference to the doctrine of 
consideration, a facet of the defenses that continues in many statements 
of them today. 
Part II addresses logic and policy.  Part II.A begins with a discussion 
of the policy grounds for the consideration doctrine and, incidentally, 
defends the doctrine.  Part II.B shows the logical, doctrinal, and policy 
coincidence of consideration and the defenses.  The defenses all show 
more than lack of assent, but they fully respond to, and coincide 
conceptually with, the plaintiff’s allegation of consideration.  Part III 
briefly concludes. 
This Article is the second of two addressing the primacy of 
consideration and the resultant superfluity of assent doctrines in contract 
formation law.  The first article, Assent Is Not an Element of Contract 
Formation,
1 
showed that assent as an element of formation merely 
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duplicates a function already performed by the doctrine of consideration.  
One can have assent without consideration, but one cannot have 
consideration without assent.
2
  Because consideration is required, assent 
was and is already required as part of the consideration analysis.  There 
is therefore no need for a separate element of assent.  The first paper 
shows that the assent doctrines’ true function is merely to determine 
when consideration was given; the assent doctrines show the time of 
formation when that is important, not whether formation occurred.
3
 
This second article shows the doctrinal and conceptual primacy of 
consideration and resultant superfluity of assent doctrine with respect to 
the formation defenses.  Commentators commonly suggest that the 
formation defenses exist because they undercut assent.  This assertion is 







 and even unconscionability.
7




I am not claiming that the defenses do not undercut assent.  They do.  
A primary point of Assent Is Not an Element of Contract Formation is 
that consideration, as both a concept and a legal doctrine, includes assent.  
One cannot have consideration without assent.  Duress and 
misrepresentation or fraud, for example, undercut assent not just in 
                                                          
 2. Id. at 593–94 & passim. 
 3. Id. at 591 & passim. 
 4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174, 174 cmt. a (1981).  The 
Restatement’s phrase for this is “not effective as a manifestation of assent.”  Id. § 174.  Williston 
holds likewise, as do Farnsworth, Fried, and Murray.  28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 71:8 (4th ed. 2003); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS § 4.16 (3d ed. 2004); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 93–103 (1981); JOHN 
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 93 (4th ed. 2001). 
 5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 163, 163 cmt. a (1981); 28 WILLISTON & 
LORD, supra note 4, § 71:8; 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 4.10; MURRAY, supra note 4, § 92. 
 6. See 27 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 70:10 (“no mutuality of assent (i.e., no 
‘meeting of the minds’)”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 315 (1909) (justifying 
fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake on lack of assent).  This approach is not unanimous.  The 
Restatement (Second) justifies relief for mutual mistake on “the notion of an unexpected material 
imbalance in the exchange.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 6, intro. note (1981).  
 7. See MURRAY, supra note 4, § 92.  Unconscionability is (perhaps more) often grouped with 
doctrines policing “Fairness and the Public Interest.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 
9, topic 2 (1981); 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 18:7; MURRAY, supra note 4 (grouping 
unconscionability with illegal bargains); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness 
in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 22–24 
(2012) (also reporting judicial opinions analyzing unconscionability as centered on assent). 
 8. Richard Epstein justified the formation defenses on the ground that each defense, when 
applicable, undercuts any assumption that the parties will gain from the transaction.  RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 80–82 (1995), cited with approval in JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.1 (6th ed. 2009). 
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contract law but also in other areas of the law.
9
  Inasmuch as duress and 
misrepresentation undercut assent, they also undercut consideration.  But 
as the defenses are phrased and as they function in contract law, they 
undercut more than assent.  Assent therefore does not “occup[y] the 
entire area”
10
 it is said to cover.  It fails to exercise “normative authority 
over”
11
 the defenses.  It therefore does not “in fact function[] as a 
justification”
12
 for the formation defenses.  Something other than assent 
shapes the defenses’ form and function.  That something else is 
consideration. 
These conclusions combined with the historical, doctrinal, and 
logical arguments presented in Assent Is Not an Element of Contract 
Formation show that, of assent and consideration, consideration is 
elemental.  Assent, on the other hand, is not elemental but is subordinate 
and dependent on the consideration doctrine. 
I. DEFENSES TO FORMATION: DOCTRINE AND HISTORY 
Assent is a late and subordinate addition to contract formation 
doctrine.  Whereas consideration debuted in assumpsit actions in 1539,
13 
assent appeared only in 1818.
14
  Consistent with the mistaken assumption 
that the formation defenses are justified as undercutting assent, historians 
have at times also implied that the defenses arose as responses to assent, 
and late in the game.
15
  However, each was in fact a defense, in law or 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., People v. Morrison, 39 Cal. Rptr. 874, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (affirming a 
kidnapping jury instruction holding that “where one assents to accompany another due to duress, 
fear or threats of bodily harm, the person so assenting is not considered to be exercising his or her 
own free will, and the crime of kidnapping may lie”); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 252 (1934).  Hat 
tip to Mark Gergen for this point. 
 10. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 332, 334 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See David Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt in the Early Sixteenth Century: The Origins of the 
Indebitatus Count, 41 C.L.J. 142, 143 (1982). 
 14. Ricks, supra note 1, at 604–20; A.W.B. SIMPSON, Innovation in Nineteenth Century 
Contract Law, reprinted in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 
171, 182–86 (1987).  
 15. E.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE 
ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 535 (1975) (“The idea that mistake could form an independent ground for 
invalidity belongs to the nineteenth century, when the theory of consensus ad idem, the meeting of 
minds, held sway.”); James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished 
Business, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1815, 1847–48 (2000) (“A.W.B. Simpson and I have shown that these 
doctrines were unknown to the earlier common law, and were borrowed, sometimes word-for-word, 
from continental authors.”).  Gordley mistakenly assumes that the English common law borrowed 
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equity or both, to a promise and consideration in assumpsit long before 
assent became part of contract law in the early 1800s. 
A.  Duress 
Duress has a history in English law stretching at least back to 
Bracton (circa 1210–1268 CE).
16
  It was a defense even to an action for 
debt on a bond before 1500 and remained so.
17
  Though there is little 
evidence of a plea of the defense of duress in the law and operation of 
assumpsit cases,
18
 Simpson suggests “the explanation may be that if the 
defendant wished to contend that he promised because of a threat or 
because of imprisonment his proper course would be to plead the general 
issue and give the circumstances in evidence as showing the promise was 
devoid of consideration.”
19
  I have found some proof of this.  In Stanton 
v. Suliard,
20
 a successful litigant promised the Sheriff of Essex that he 
                                                          
them only later.  In fact, the ideas crop up fairly frequently in the English legal system that dealt with 
enforcing promises, at least from the mid-1500s onward, the period covered by this paper.  That they 
were unknown is an overstatement.  They had not reached their twentieth-century point of evolution, 
certainly. 
 16. 2 HENRICI DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 288 (George E. 
Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (1569), available at  
http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/Common/SearchPage.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  
 17. VI SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1483–1558, at 829 
(2003); SIMPSON, supra note 15, at 99.  The common law includes numerous early instances of 
duress being used to escape debt on a bond.  See, e.g., Martin v. Cole, (1734) 24 Eng. Rep. 1070, 
1072 (Ch.), 3 P. Wms. 290, 295 (“A man was caught in bed with another’s wife; and the husband 
who caught him, having a sword in his hand, was about to kill the man, who was naked, and in the 
power of the husband.  But upon the man’s desiring the husband not to take that advantage of him, 
and saying, that he would make him reparation; thereupon they went into another room, where the 
man gave the husband a note for £100 payable at certain time.  After which, the money growing due, 
the husband came for payment; and the man excusing payment, gave his bond for the money, and 
afterwards brought his bill to be relieved.  The Lord Cowper declared, that if the matter had rested 
on the note, which was gained by a man armed, from one naked, and by duress, though it happened 
to be given in satisfaction for the greatest injury (in which case, however, the utmost remedy the law 
would have given had been damages to be ascertained by a jury), he should have made no difficulty 
of granting relief; but when afterwards the plaintiff had coolly, and without any pretence of fear or 
duress, entered into a bond to the husband, he had thereby himself ascertained the damages, and 
ought not to be relieved.”);Woodman v. Skuse, (1708) 22 Eng. Rep. 157, 158 (Ch.), 2 Eq. Cases 
Abr. 183, 184 (also reported at 25 Eng. Rep. 7, Gilb. Rep. 9) (attributing to Lord Cowper (d. 1723) 
the following: “Lord Cowper declared that if the Matter had rested on the Note which was gained by 
a Man armed from one naked, and by Duress, tho’ it happened to be given in Satisfaction for the 
greatest Injury (in which Case, however, the utmost Remedy the Law would have given B. had been 
Damages to be ascertained by a Jury), he should have made no Difficulty of granting Relief . . . .”); 
Huscombe v. Standing, (1607) 79 Eng. Rep. 163, Cro. Jac. 187 (dicta). 
 18. SIMPSON, supra note 15, at 537. 
 19. Id. 
 20. (1599) 78 Eng. Rep. 893 (Ex. Ch.), Cro. Eliz. 654. 
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would pay the Sheriff a certain statutory fee if the Sheriff would levy an 
execution.
21
  The Sheriff executed, and when the litigant did not pay the 
fee, the Sheriff sued in assumpsit.
22
  The litigant pleaded the general plea 
in denial, non assumpsit, and when the Sheriff won at trial, the litigant 
appealed on the grounds “there was not any sufficient consideration[,] 
for” having to pay a public official to do his job was extortion.
23
  One 
Justice, Glanville, agreed, but no one else did.
24
  The other judges 
reasoned that, because the Sheriff could legally take the fee, the Sheriff 
therefore could legally take a promise for the fee.
25
  No one argued that 
extortion did not belong under the general plea, however.  I have found 
two other, similar cases from the same time period.
26
   
Much more interesting is Ricord v. Bettenham (1765).
27
  Bettenham 
was captain of the British ship “Syren,” and Ricord captain of the French 
privateer “Badine.”
28
  Britain and France were at war.
29
  The Badine 
captured the Syren, took its first mate hostage, and held the Syren for 
ransom.
30
  The Syren was on a schedule, and in order to get the ship back 
and make its next port, Bettenham “obliged himself and owners to pay” 
the ransom amount equal to 236l.
31
  Ricord took Bettenham’s note and 
let the Syren go.
32
  The Syren made port.
33
  Ricord later made his way to 
Britain and sued Bettenham on his promise.
34
  Bettenham pleaded non 
assumpsit.
35
  Ricord’s attorney, who argued first, argued against duress.
36
  
                                                          
 21. Id. at 893. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. Justice Glanville had a decent argument.  See Sherley v. Packer, (1616) 81 Eng. Rep. 
509, 510 (K.B.), 1 Rolle. 313, 314 (finding consideration paid to a sheriff invalid because a statute 
provided “que nul viscount prendera ascun deniers pur server de proces, & pur ceo le receiver de 
ceux deniers est extortion”). 
 26. Both cases involve discussion of the statutory rights of sheriffs to a fee and whether some 
duress, hardship, or extortion render the promise of a fee not actionable.  All of the discussion takes 
place on appeal of a trespass on the case in assumpsit for lack of consideration.  See Bath v. Salter, 
(1625) 73 Eng. Rep. 1009 (K.B.), Benl. 138, 73 Eng. Rep. 1015, Benl. 147; Sherley, 81 Eng. Rep. at 
509–10. 
 27. (1765) 96 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B.), 1 Black. W. 563. 
 28. Id. at 326.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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Bettenham’s attorney, however, waived the duress issue.
37
  But no one 
argued that duress was improper on the general plea.
38
  Much later, in the 
United States, evidence that a duress defense was available after a 
defensive plea of non assumpsit became more explicit.
39
 
Sheppard put a limitation on promise enforcement this way in his 
1663 treatise on actions on the case: 
If I arrest a man, to the end hee should ingage himself to mee, for 
mony, where none is due, and hee being in prison, doth so, so that the 
promise is made by Duresse of Imprisonment; this is void. . . .  [I]f one 
threaten to kill, beat, wound, or imprison mee, unlesse I will make him 
such a promise, and thereupon, and for this cause onely, I do it, let the 
promise be made to him that both threaten mee, or to another, it is void, 
and the Action brought upon it may be avoided for this.  But the 
threatning of mee to kill, beat, wound, or imprison my Father, Mother, 
Childe, Brother, Sister, or friend; or the threatning of mee to burn my 




It was a harsh world, but that does not mean every promise was 
enforceable. 
On the flip side, courts also decided long before assent became part 
of the law that an action in a form of assumpsit, specifically indebitatus 
assumpsit for money had and received,
41
 was available to recover 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 327.  
 38. Blackstone was co-counsel for the defense.  Id. at 328.  When Lord Mansfield C.J. 
expressed doubts about how to rule, Blackstone offered to inquire whether France and Holland 
would entertain such an action.  Id.  Mansfield took him up on the offer, and Blackstone later 
reported that all the foreign lawyers he talked to said their countries would allow it.  Id.  Mansfield 
then said, “I imagined the enquiry would turn out as it has done.”  Id.  He then ruled for the plaintiff: 
“Justice ought in time of war to be administered to foreigners in our Courts in the most extensive and 
liberal manner, because the Crown cannot here interpose, as it can in absolute monarchies, to compel 
the subject to do justice, in an extrajudicial manner.”  Id. 
 39. See counsel’s argument in Moore v. Ex’rs of Moore, 1 N.J.L. 363, 373, 1795 WL 593 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. 1795) (“Under the plea of non assumpsit anything which shows that ex equo et bono, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover, may be given in evidence, as payment, usury, duress, nonage, 
&c.”); see, e.g., Bell v. Adm’rs of Wood, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 247, 1792 WL 206 (1792) (“It came out 
from the evidence in this case” in assumpsit that the promise was made under duress, justifying a 
jury verdict for the defendants.). 
 40. WILLIAM SHEPPARD, ACTIONS UPON THE CASE FOR DEEDS, VIZ. CONTRACTS, ASSUMPSITS, 
DECEIPTS, NUSANCES, TROVER AND CONVERSION, DELIVERY OF GOODS, AND FOR OTHER MALE-
FEASANCE AND MIS-FEASANCE 90 (London, 1663) (citations omitted). 
 41. The action for indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received was regular by 1610.  See, 
e.g., Rooke v. Rooke, (1610) 79 Eng. Rep. 210, Cro. Jac. 245, 80 Eng. Rep. 117, Yel. 175; J.H. 
Baker, The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 
37, 44 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998). 
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damages against someone who had extorted money by duress.  In Astley 
v. Reynolds,
42
 the plaintiff pawned goods for 20l. and after three years 
came to redeem them.
43
  The defendant requested 10l. interest, a usurious 
amount.
44
  The plaintiff tendered 4l., and when the defendant refused to 
give up the goods, the plaintiff gave 10l. and sued in indebitatus 
assumpsit for money had and received.
45
  The court granted relief, 
saying, per curiam, “[T]his is a payment by compulsion . . . .”
46
  It would 
be amazing if the law courts allowed money to be recovered in 
indebitatus assumpsit that was paid under duress but forced the payment 
of damages for breach of a promise made under the same duress to pay 
the same money. 
Finally, the chancery, which followed consideration doctrine,
47
 might 
grant relief for duress in actions based on agreement.
48
  It seems clear 
                                                          
 42. (1733) 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B.), 2 Str. 915. 
 43. Id. at 939.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  The report at 94 Eng. Rep. 343, 343–44, 2 Barn. K.B. 40, 41–42, has only Raymond, 
C.J., agreeing with the duress rationale, and one judge dissenting, but states that they held over for 
argument another day and later gave the plaintiff judgment.  It is possible that Strange reported the 
later decision. 
 47. See 21 Eng. Rep. 148 (Ch.), Toth. 141 (“The opinion of the Court was, the plaintiff having 
but a promise, could have no decree for the land, yet it might be decreed that the defendant might 
assure the land, Ferne contra Bullock, decreed upon a promise, and ten shillings in hand to assure, in 
Nov. 9 Jac. [1611].”); 21 Eng. Rep. 155 (Ch.), Toth. 162 (“Ferne contra Bullock, Mich. 9 Jac. li. A. 
fo. 274 [1611], the defendant promised to sell the plaintiff land, whereof ten shillings was given him, 
yet the defendant would not perform, yet he should.”); 21 Eng. Rep. 154 (Ch.), Toth. 159 (“Standen 
contra Bullock, the plaintiff bought several manors of Thomas Bullock, deceased, who (before the 
plaintiff’s purchase) had conveyed the same by fine and recovery to the defendant and his heirs 
males, which being done without consideration, was adjudged and decreed to the Plaintiff, in 38 
Eliz. li. A. fo. 713 [1595-96], and 42 Eliz. li. B. fo. 289 [1599-1600] . . . .”); Anonymous, 21 Eng. 
Rep. 3, 3 (Ch.), Cary 5, 5 (“Upon nudum pactum there ought to be no more help in Chancery than 
there is at the common law, neither against him that hath waged his law in debt, though peradventure 
falsely.”); Anonymous, 21 Eng. Rep. 5, 5 (Ch.), Cary 9, 9 (“A delivereth twenty pounds to B to the 
use of C, a woman, to be delivered her the day of her marriage.  Before her marriage, A 
countermandeth it, and calleth home the money.  C shall not be aided in Chancery, because there is 
no consideration why she should have it (Dyer, 49).”). 
 48. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, (1716) 22 Eng. Rep. 22, 23 (Ch.), 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 26, 26 
(reporting a nine-hour trial on the duress issue); Mulsoe v. Montague, (1680–81) 79 SELDEN SOC. 
852 (case no. 1068) (Ch.); 21 Eng. Rep. 106 (Ch.), Toth. 4 (“Plowden contra Marsham, if agreement 
be compelled by threats, it shall not bind, in Hil. 3 Cat. [1628], look 10th of June 1602, the contrary 
between lord and tenant.”); de York v. Crop, (1337) 10 SELDEN SOC. 127 (case no. 134) (Ch.) 
(petition for relief from bonds on ground of duress by imprisonment); cf. Woodman v. Skuse, (1708) 
25 Eng. Rep. 7, 7 (Ch.), Gilb. Rep. 9, 9 (Cowper, Ch., in dicta, after examining the facts, which 
showed the cool-headed affirmation of the promise after the fact: “If a Jury in this Case had given 
Damages, this Court could not relieve.”); 21 Eng. Rep. 158 (Ch.), Toth. 170 (“Maneright contra 
Roberts, a man relieved against his own deed, the same being gotten by threats and practice, though 
the same be vested in an infant, and the purchaser to become bound in recognizance to assure it, 
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that, in the minds of the lawyers who invented the consideration doctrine, 
and their successors, duress was either a factual showing that indicated 
no consideration existed or a defense to an action on facts that would 
have been brought on the case for assumpsit.  At any rate, duress appears 
firmly established as a defense in the minds of those lawyers who 
practiced contract law from the time consideration was required until the 
time assent was added conceptually, and duress appears for all we can 
see to render a promise unenforceable.
49
 
B. Misrepresentation or Fraud 
Misrepresentation or fraud has a similar history, just as old,
50
 though 
the evidence is more apparent in the time period in which consideration 
became the touchstone of relief in assumpsit.  Relief was available for 
misrepresentation, and the evidence demonstrates that the common 
lawyers had integrated misrepresentation or deceit into how they handled 
assumpsit claims. 
First, proof of misrepresentation was apparently admissible by a 
defendant on a plea of non assumpsit, just as was proof of duress.  In a 
case decided around 1600, Collins’s daughter wanted to marry Mr. 
Wills.
51
  Collins promised Wills 80l. in marriage and no more, but Wills 
wanted 90l.
52
  The daughter then, in consideration that Collins would 
give Wills another 10l., promised to return it to Collins after the 
marriage.
53
  Collins gave Wills 90l., and the marriage occurred.
54
  Then 
Wills refused to give back the 10l., and apparently his wife did not give it 
back, either.
55
  So Collins brought an action on the case in assumpsit 
against Wills for his wife’s promise.
56
  Wills pleaded non assumpsit, and 
a jury found against him, but on appeal Wills argued “that this was an 
insufficient and unlawful consideration to ground this action, and made 
only in deceit of the defendant, who was her husband.—And of that 
                                                          
when, &c., in 10 Jac. [1612-13].”). 
 49. Duress’s near cousin, undue influence, a doctrine that applies not just to contracts but all 
kinds of juridical acts, was also developed soon after the consideration doctrine.  The doctrine is 
often attributed to Joy v. Bannister (Ch. 1617), reported in REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY FRANCIS 
BACON 33 (John Ritchie ed., 1932). 
 50. See BRACTON, supra note 16. 
 51. Collins v. Wills, (1600) 78 Eng. Rep. 1004, 1004 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 774, 774. 
 52. Id.   
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
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opinion was the whole Court . . . .”
57
  This is a somewhat unorthodox 
fraud claim, but that is probably why it was the subject of a report.  If 
evidence of misrepresentation was admissible on a general plea of non 
assumpsit, then the misrepresentation issue would go to the jury, and no 
other report or evidence of a garden-variety misrepresentation defense 
would be available. 
Sheppard later put a case this way: 
If I sell my horse first to one, on condition that hee pay mee five pound 
such a day, and before the day I sell him to another; this second 
Contract seems to be void, albeit I bee not paid my five pound, and that 
I seize him again, and therefore the first Contract is good.  And a man 
may not sell that which is none of his own.
58
 
But of course, one actually may sell that which is not his own, because 
he may buy it before delivery is due.
59
  The problem in this case appears 
to be the deceit. 
Second, the assumpsit action itself was in part based on an allegation 
of deceit.  Baker records the evolution of the typical assumpsit pleading.  
Early on, the assumpsit pleading form alleged an undertaking to perform 
an act in return for money, and a failure to act.
60
  Over time, the pleading 
form split the bargain and the promise into separate clauses, alleged 
separate consequential damages flowing from the breach of promise 
itself, and concluded with “a general allegation of deceit and injurious 
reliance.”
61
  The model for this, as Baker notes, was Doige’s Case,
62
 
which alleged an actual act of misfeasance that disabled the promisor 
from performing (the land vendor enfeoffed someone other than the 
                                                          
 57. Id.; see also 1 Rolle. (reporting the case c. 1600) (“car le consideracion n’est bon, mes le 
promise fuit fraudulent & covenous”).  Collins perhaps sat around a bit while the judges decided 
what to do with it.  See Collins v. Wills, (c. 1597) 72 Eng. Rep. 701, 701 (K.B.), Moo. K.B. 468, 468 
(suggestion of Popham, C.J., that the defendant could alternately have pleaded the deceit); Collins v. 
Wills, (c. 1597) 74 Eng. Rep. 901, 901 (K.B.), Ow. 63, 63 (Popham, C.J.’s opining that the 
consideration was void, against the opinion of Gawdy, J., and Fenner, J., who believed the action 
maintainable). 
 58. SHEPPARD, supra note 40, at 78; see also id. at 35. 
 59. This appears to be the meaning of another case Sheppard cites, where I sell two horses 
together, my own and another’s, and the other takes his horse before the purchaser pays the money.  
Id. at 35.  Sheppard specified that I may recover the money but the purchaser may sue me afterward 
for deceit.  Id. 
 60. BAKER, supra note 17, at 850. 
 61. Id. at 851. 
 62. Shipton v. Dog, (1440) K.B. roll, Trin. 18 Hen. V, K.B. 27/717, m. 111, London, reported 
in A.K.R. KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 192–93 (1957) (Kiralfy’s translation of the 
pleadings in the case). 
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promisee).
63
  But if the deceit allegation helped at all, it would also help 
in a pure nonfeasance case, where it was afterward alleged.
64
  In fact, it 
was common feeling at the time that the extension of trespass to breach 
of promise occurred in part because of the deceit allegation.
65
  Thus, 
promises that were deceitful in themselves could be remedied in 
assumpsit cases. 
Third, even beyond fraudulent promises, some misrepresentation was 
itself actionable in assumpsit.  In Chandelor v. Lopus,
66 
the defendant, a 
goldsmith, “affirmed to Lopus [that a certain stone was] a bezar-stone, 
and sold it to him for one hundred pounds; [but] it was not a bezar-
stone . . . .”
67
  The plaintiff won a verdict, but on appeal the Exchequer 
Chamber, all the common law judges save one agreeing, reversed.
68
  
“[T]he bare affirmation that it was a bezar-stone, without warranting it to 
be so, is no cause of action: and although he knew it to be no bezar-
stone, it is not material . . . .”
69
  The report assures, however, that had 
Chandelor warranted that it was a bezar-stone at the time of the sale, 
Lopus would have succeeded in an action on the case.
70
  Sheppard lists 
                                                          
 63. See id.; J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE 
LAW TO 1750, at 390 (1986) (summarizing the pleading); see also the pleading in Orwell v. Mortoft 
(C.P. 1505), id. at 406, which alleged that the defendant, “scheming fraudulently and craftily to 
defraud the said Thomas, wholly converted the aforesaid 60 quarters of barley to his own use and did 
not deliver it within the aforesaid time.” 
 64. See, e.g., Slade’s Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1072 (K.B.), 4 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b 
(alleging defendant acted “subtilly and craftily to deceive and defraud”); Gower v. Capper, (1597) 
78 Eng. Rep. 790, 790 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 543, 544 (a mutual promise case in which the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant produced inadequate performance, “intending to deceive”); Bretton v. 
Bolton, (1592) 78 Eng. Rep. 501, 502, Cro. Eliz. 246, 247 (“[D]efendant falsely and maliciously 
deceived . . . plaintiff . . . .”); see also Pykeryng v. Thurgoode, (1532) 94 SELDEN SOC. 247, 248 
(K.B.) (“machinans”).  
 65. See Pinchon’s Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 859, 863, 9 Co. Rep. 86b, 89a (Coke reports all 
the judges agreeing “in respect that the breach of promise is alledged to be mixed with fraud and 
deceit to the special prejudice of the plaintiff, and for that reason it is called trespass on the case.”); 
Kirkby v. Coles, (1589) 78 Eng. Rep. 394, 394 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 137, 138 (Wray, C.J., and Clench, 
J.’s asserting “the action was grounded upon the promise and deceit”).   
 66. (1602) 79 Eng. Rep. 3, (Ex. Ch.), Cro. Jac. 4. 
 67. Id. at 3–4. 
 68. Id. at 4.  Anderson, J., disagreed.  Id. 
 69. Id.  The judgment was not free of doubt.  Popham, C.J., kept the case under argument until 
at least 1606, claiming that scienter, not warranty, made the difference.  Chandelor v. Lopus, as 
reported in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 63, at 518, 521–22; see also Kenrick v. Burges, (1583) 72 
Eng. Rep. 483 (K.B.), Moo. K.B. 126 (supporting Popham’s position). 
 70. Chandelor, 79 Eng. Rep. at 4.  See also Harvey v. Yonge, (1602) 80 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B.), 
Yel. 21, as reported in SIMPSON, supra note 15, at 639 (“And it was held that an action does not 
lie . . . on the naked assertion of S . . . . But it would be otherwise if S had warranted the term to be 
of such value, for the warranty is a means of inducing confidence.”); SIMPSON, supra note 15, at 
535–37 (discussing the evolution of the “old action for deceit for breach of warranty . . . in 
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And beyond breach of warranty, misrepresentation became a ground 
fairly early for an action for money had and received, another case of 
indebitatus assumpsit.
72
  For example, in Cross v. Gardner,
73
 a seller 
possessed certain oxen.
74
  After a conversation in which the seller 
claimed to own the oxen, the buyer agreed to buy them and paid the 
price.
75
  Later, however, the real owner of the oxen repossessed them.
76
  
The buyer then sued the seller in assumpsit for deceit.
77
  The court held 
for the plaintiff notwithstanding there was no warranty.
78
 
This development, combined with the notion that the general 
assumpsit action was grounded in deceit, allowed Lord Mansfield to 
declare in 1760, 
If one man takes another’s money to do a thing, and refuses to do it; it 
is a fraud: and it is at the election of the party injured, either to affirm 
the agreement, by bringing an action for the non-performance of it; or 
to disaffirm the agreement ab initio, by reason of the fraud, and bring 
an action for money had and received to his use.
79
 
Notice the tie to consideration: Fraud occurs when one “takes another’s 
money to do a thing.”  It is when the promise given for consideration is 
not accomplished that the fraud label is imposed.  In this way assumpsit 
was a kind of action for deceit. 
And, as Mansfield noted, fraud or deceit had become a ground for 
recovery of money in indebitatus assumpsit.
80
  As with duress, it would 
                                                          
connection with the contract of sale”). 
 71. SHEPPARD, supra note 40, at 105–08. 
 72. E.g., Lady Cavendish v. Middleton, (1628) 79 Eng. Rep. 725 (K.B.), Cro, Car. 141, 82 Eng. 
Rep. 104, Jones, W. 196 (allowing the action to recover a payment of money induced by 
misrepresentation); see also Kenrick v. Burges, (1583) 72 Eng. Rep. 483, 484 (K.B.), Moo. K.B. 
126, 127 (“Auxi le Court ceo prist que accon sur le case gist en nature de disceit . . . .  Mes Tho. 
Gawdy dit que le accon ne gist, si non que il alleage que le def. sciens . . . .”). 
 73. (1689) 89 Eng. Rep. 453 (K.B.), 1 Shower, K.B. 68. 
 74. Id. at 453.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 454; see also SHEPPARD, supra note 40, at 107–08 (listing other cases). 
 79. Moses v. Macferlan, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (K.B.), 2 Burr. 1005, 1011. 
 80. See Astley v. Reynolds, (1733) 93 Eng. Rep. 939, 939 (K.B.), 2 Str. 915, 916 (“[P]er 
Curiam, the cases of payments by mistake or deceit, are not to be disputed . . . .”); Tomkyns v. 
Barnet, (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 182, 182–83 (K.B.), Skin. 411, 411–12 (Holt, C.J.) (opining that relief 
should be granted against and “upon a fraud in the receiver”); Tomkins v. Bernet, (1693) 91 Eng. 
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have made little sense to grant recovery for money obtained by fraud but 
to enforce a promise obtained by fraud to pay money. 
Finally, as it did with duress, the Chancery granted relief for fraud.
81
  
It is difficult to know whether the Chancery ordered rescission
82
 or 
                                                          
Rep. 21, 21 (C.P.), 1 Salk. 22, 22 (“Treby C.J. allowed, that . . . where one pays money under or by a 
mere deceit, it is reasonable he should have his money again . . . .”). 
 81. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Duke, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 274, 274 (Ch.), 1 Vern. 19, 19 (“[I]t was said 
by my Lord Chancellor, that it is the constant rule, where there is either suppressio veri or suggestio 
falsi, the release shall be avoided.”); 21 Eng. Rep. 157, Toth. 170 (“Tuck contra Pattison, the 
plaintiff relieved upon a promise against a deed of purchase, there being some, practice in the 
purchaser, in April, 11 Jac. [1613].”); Flete v. Lynster, (1417–24) 10 SELDEN SOC. 116 (case no. 
119) (Ch.) (petition for relief from a purchase agreement for fraudulent inducement); Brampton v. 
Seymour, (1386) 10 SELDEN SOC. 2 (case no. 2) (Ch.) (petition for relief from a release for 
fraudulent inducement); 10 SELDEN SOC. xxxiii (Ch.) (listing petitions for relief on grounds of 
fraud); cf. 21 Eng. Rep. 158, Toth. 170 (“Maneright contra Roberts, a man relieved against his own 
deed, the same being gotten by threats and practice, though the same be vested in an infant, and the 
purchaser to become bound in recognizance to assure it, when, &c. in 10 Jac. [1612-13].”)  Fraud 
was also examinable in the creation of a use.  See Anonymous, 21 Eng. Rep. 8, 8, Cary 14, 14 (“If A 
sell land to B for twenty pounds, with confidence, that it shall be to the use of A, yet A shall have no 
remedy here, because the bargain hath a consideration in itself (Dyer, 169, per Harper); and such a 
consideration in an indenture of bargain and sale seemeth not to be examinable, except fraud be 
objected, because it is an estoppel.”); see also, e.g., Joy v. Bannister (Ch. 1967), reported in 
REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY FRANCIS BACON 33 (John Ritchie ed., 1932) (ruling regarding a 
deed and will obtained “by practice and circumvention”). 
 82. Chancery could order litigation on a promise to cease, which is the functional equivalent of 
rescission.  E.g., Crowder v. Robinson, 21 Eng. Rep. 71, 71 (Ch.), Choyce Cases. 115, 115 (“An 
Injunction to stay an action at Common Law the suite in this Court having the precedency.—An 
Injunction was awarded against the defendant, for stay of an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit 
by him brought in her Majesties Bench against the plaintiff for or concerning an agreement or 
contract for a Lease for the which before the plaintiff had exhibited his Bill. Crowder plaintiff, 
Robinson defendant. Anno 19 & 20 Eliz. [1577].”); Cotes v. Freston, 21 Eng. Rep. 67, 67 (Ch.), 
Choyce Cases. 109, 109 (“An Injunction to stay Execution.—A Writ is awarded against the 
Defendant, his Councellors and Attorneys, that they upon penalty of £100 shall sue no execution of a 
Judgement in an Action of debt commenced by the Defendant against the Plaintiff at the common 
Law, until further order be taken therein by this Court of Chancery.  Robert Cotes Clerk Plaintiff, 
John Freston Defendant.  Anno 5 & 6 P. & M. [1558].”); Ayland v. Bacon, 21 Eng. Rep. 19, 19 
(Ch.), Cary 36, 36 (“An injunction is awarded against the defendant, to stay his proceedings in the 
Sheriff’s Court, of London, or elsewhere, upon debt of one hundred pounds, not to proceed to trial, 
judgment, or to execution, if judgment be given; John Ayland, plaintiff; Francis Bacon, defendant 
(Anno 5 & 6 Philip & Mary, fol. 29 [1558]).”); Stanebridge v. Hales, 21 Eng. Rep. 24, 24 (Ch.), 
Cary 45, 45 (“An injunction was granted against the defendant upon pain of one hundred pounds, 
that he should not prosecute an action of debt of five pounds, or any writ of nisi prius, jury, 
judgment, or execution of judgment, if judgment be given, before the Justices of either Bench, until 
special licence be given by this Court: Thomas Stanebridge, plaintant; Thomas Hales defendant 
(Anno 1 Eliz fol. 103 [1558-59]).”).  If the injunction was ignored, and judgment was taken, the 
Chancellor could enjoin the plaintiff to acknowledge satisfaction of that judgment.  Colverwell v. 
Bongey, 21 Eng. Rep. 25, 25 (Ch.), Cary 45, 45–46 (“The defendant, notwithstanding an injunction 
delivered unto him, got a judgment upon an action of debt in the Common Pleas; and decreed upon 
the hearing of the cause that the defendant shall within fourteen days next after the decree resort to 
the record in the Common Pleas, whereupon the said judgment is entered, and there to confess of 
record a full satisfaction of the said judgment.”). 
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simply refused to order performance
83
 (if neither was necessary, the 
Chancery would send the case back to the law courts
84
), but the 
possibility of relief in Chancery also made fraud part of the rules 
governing promises. 
Clearly, misrepresentation or fraud had a long road of development 
before it would reach what was later to become our modern 
misrepresentation defense, pleadable affirmatively in a legal action or the 
basis for an equitable action for rescission,
85
 but it was also firmly in the 
minds of lawyers litigating contract disputes long before assent became a 
doctrinal issue in contract.  Not only is there no hint that anyone saw this 
as a problem to be solved, but it went hand in hand with the assumpsit 
rules then in force. 
C. Mistake 
Mistake as a defect in contract formation has a long history 
                                                          
 83. Chancery had power to order performance.  See Arnold v. Barrington, (1631) 21 Eng. Rep. 
167, 168 (Ch.), Dick. 5, 6 (ordering specific performance of a promise to convey lands); 21 Eng. 
Rep. 155 (Ch.), Toth. 163 (“Plaile contra Plaile, the defendant promised to his father to assure 
certain copyhold lands to the plaintiff, but the father dying before any surrender denied to assure the 
same, yet decreed he should, 21st May, 9 Jac. [1611].”); id. (“Egerton contra Eldred, the defendant 
promised to procure a lease of certain lands for the plaintiff, from the contractors, but passed the 
same to himself, yet ordered and decreed that the same shall be passed to the plaintiff, according to 
the first agreement, in Feb. 8 Jac. June, 11 Jac. [1611, 1613].”); 21 Eng. Rep. 155 (Ch.), Toth. 162 
(“Where the law cannot give a lease, or a thing promised but damage, there is some cause for the 
Court to compel the party to perform the thing promised, Browne contra North, Waller contra 
Salter, in Trin. 8 Jac. li. A. [1610].”); id. (“A man promiseth to assure lands in consideration of 
marriage, but after the marriage refuseth, yet ordered, Gerard’s case, in 2 Jac. li. A. fo. 202 [1604-
5].”); id. (“Long contra Long, in 40 Eliz. li. A. fo. 360, or 369 [1597-98], the defendant promised 
and agreed to assure leases in marriage with the plaintiff’s daughters, who would not perform it, but 
ordered.”); Butler v. Denton, (c. 1582–83) 21 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ch.), Choyce Cases. 166 (order to 
assure lands according to a bargain and agreement). 
 84. See Grevill v. Bowker, 21 Eng. Rep. 84, 84 (Ch.), Choyce Cases. 140, 140 (“The suite is for 
a promise supposed by the Plaintiff to be made to him by the defendant, to yeeld up and surrender a 
Lease of a pasture and certain tithes upon the payment of 100 Marks by the plaintiff to the 
defendant, and dismissed upon hearing, as more meet to be decided at the Common Law then [sic] in 
this Court. Grevill plaintiff, Bowker defendant.  Anno 22 Eliz. [1579-80].”); Sutton v. Eringto, 21 
Eng. Rep. 84, 84, Choyce Cases. 140, 140–41 (also reported at 21 Eng. Rep. 52, Cary 97) (“Consim. 
- Sutton Plaintiff, Eringto Defendant, a suit upon a promise, and twelve pence accepted in 
consideration, referred to the Common Law, Anno 22 Eliz. [1579-80].”).  Cary thought this 
important enough to write down: “Conscience never resisteth the law, nor addeth to it, but only 
where the law is directly in itself against the law of God, or the law of Reason; for in other things, 
Equitas sequitur legem (Saint Germaine, fol. 85. 155).”  21 Eng. Rep. 6, Cary 11. 
 85. See generally DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS 208–11, 234–36, 252 (1999) (discussing the development of fraud); Michael Lobban, 
Contractual Fraud in Law and Equity, c1750-c1850, 17 O.J.L.S. 441 (1997). 
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stretching back to at least the 1600s.
86
  It came in fits and starts.  In 
Chandelor v. Lopus (1602),
87 
whether a warranty existed or not, both 
parties acted on the assumption that the stone was a bezar.
88
  The case 
suggests the mistaken assumption was irrelevant.  But English lawyers 
were good enough at natural law to know that one could not convey or 
release something that did not exist,
89
 or promise something that cannot 
possibly be,
90
 so mistakes as to these things were always exceptions.  




As the consideration requirement was maturing in the late 1500s, 
courts also began granting relief in actions for indebitatus assumpsit for 
money had and received, for money paid by mistake.
92
  Eventually, some 
of these actions not only covered the mutual mistake fact pattern but also 
illustrate the tie between mistake and consideration.  In Martin v. Sitwell 
(1691),
93
 Barksdale made a policy of assurance, for a 5l. premium, 
supposedly covering goods in Martin’s name on board a boat.
 94
  At the 
time, however, Martin had no goods on board.
95
  The court held that “the 
policy is made originally void, the party for whose use it was made 
                                                          
 86. Val D. Ricks, American Mutual Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration 
Reincarnate, 58 LA. L. REV. 663, 688–715 (1998). 
 87. (1602) 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. Ch.), Cro. Jac. 4.  
 88. Id. at 3–4, discussed supra text accompanying notes 66–69. 
 89. Quick v. Ludborrow, (1615) 81 Eng. Rep. 25, 26 (K.B.), 3 Bulst. 29, 30 (also reported at 81 
Eng. Rep. 428, 1 Rolle. 196) (“[A] release doth not operate, but upon an estate, interest or right, 
none of which is here in this case, and therefore the release is void.”). 
 90. JOHN COWELL, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 172–73 (London, 1651) (“If a 
man promiseth to give a thing which is not in Rerum natura, nor cannot be possibly, it is void, so if 
one promise that which is not any ones particularly, as a thing sacred or publick.”); id. at 174  (“A 
Covenant is made also invalid, by a condition which is naturally impossible; as if the Covenant be to 
give me so much if I touch heaven with my finger . . . .”). 
 91. See, e.g., Hewer v. Bartholomew, (1598) 78 Eng. Rep. 855, 856 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 614, 614; 
see also R.M. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW 6–7 (1936) 
(discussing action of account cases allowing recovery for money paid by mistake). 
 92. See Framson v. Delamere, (1595) 78 Eng. Rep. 711, Cro. Eliz. 458; see also, e.g., Tomkyns 
v. Barnet, (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 182, 182–83 (K.B.), Skin. 411, 411–12 (“Holt Chief Justice seemed 
to incline strongly, that it did not lie; . . . and though the case was objected, that if a man pay money 
upon a policy of assurance, supposing a loss, where there was not any loss, that in such case this 
shall be money received to the use of the payer; he admitted it, because here the money was paid 
upon a mistake . . . .”); Tomkins v. Bernet, (1693) 91 Eng. Rep. 21, 21 (C.P.), 1 Salk. 22, 22 (“One, 
bound in a policy of assurance, believing the ship to be lost, when it was not, paid his money; and it 
was held he might bring an assumpsit for the money . . . .”); Bonnell v. Fowke, (1657) 82 Eng. Rep. 
1224 (K.B.), 2 Sid. 4, also reported in and discussed by Baker, supra note 41, at 50–51. 
 93. (1691) 90 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B.), Holt, K.B. 25. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 912. 
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having no goods on board, so that the money was received without any 
consideration, and consequently received to the plaintiff’s use.”
96
 
The Chancery recognized mistake as a ground for relief just as early.  
Again, there is something unnatural about a promise to convey what does 
not exist.  In a case from 1459,
97
 a defendant assigned debts to a plaintiff 
in return for which plaintiff gave a bond.
98
  The debts, being mere choses 
in action, were not assignable at this early period.
99
  The Chancery 
therefore, with the concurrence of the law courts, decided that the bond 
should be given up as without a quid pro quo.
100
  When the defendant 
refused to give up the bond, the Chancellor sent him to prison.
101
 
In Gee v. Spencer,
102
 over two hundred years later, a man, “being 
made to believe, that he should be forced to pay costs,” released his 
wife’s share of profits from a rectory that were the subject of a lawsuit.
103
  
But his belief was mistaken, and the reporter of the case concluded “that 
a misapprehension in the party shall avoid his release.”
104
  Other cases 
are scattered through the 1700s.
105
  By 1737, Henry Ballow could report 




At any rate, the same lawyers who thought of recovery in assumpsit 
as grounded on consideration recognized mistake as an exception.  
Mistake as a ground for relief was established long before assent 
formally entered the law of contracts.  When a fully matured doctrine of 
mutual mistake emerged in the early 1820s in Virginia, it was about an 
                                                          
 96. Id. 
 97. J.R.’s Case, (1459) 37 Hen. VI 13 (Ch.), available with paraphrase in English at 
http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=19278 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 286 (Ch.), 1 Vern. 32. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 287 (emphasis omitted). 
 105. See Cocking v. Pratt, (1749–50) 27 Eng. Rep. 1105, 1105 (Ch.), 1 Ves. sen. 400, 400 
(granting “relief against agreement made under a misconception of right”); Bingham v. Bingham, 
(1748) 27 Eng. Rep. 934, 934 (Ch.), 1 Ves. sen. 126, 126–27 (holding chancery warranted to grant 
relief against a “plain mistake”); Lansdown v. Lansdown, (1730) 25 Eng. Rep. 441, 441 (Ch.), Mos. 
364, 364–65 (granting relief against bonds and deeds obtained by mistake and misrepresentation); 
Broderick v. Broderick, (1713) 24 Eng. Rep. 369 (Ch.), 1 P. Wms. 239 (see the discussion of this 
case at Ricks, supra note 86, at 713–14).  But see Mildmay v. Hungerford, (1691) 23 Eng. Rep. 757, 
757 (Ch.), 2 Vern. 243, 243 (declining to grant relief for legal mistake from an already completed 
payment). 
 106. HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 10 (Nutt & Gosling 1737). 
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undercutting of the consideration.
107
  Consider the words of the Virginia 
Supreme Court in Tucker v. Cocke (1823)
108
: 
There are cases in which the mutual error of the parties, without default 
in either, may be a just ground for rescinding a contract.  As, if the 
error be in a matter which is the cause of the contract, that is, in the 
substance of the thing contracted for, so that the purchaser cannot get 
what he bargained for . . . .  In such cases, the contract ought to be 
vacated, even if it has been executed . . . .
109
 
D.  Unconscionability 
Imbalance in a bargain was supposed to be technically irrelevant to a 
breach of contract plaintiff’s prima facie case, because the law did not 
judge the adequacy of consideration.
110
  But a hard bargain could form 
the factual basis for unconscionability, which did relieve a contracting 
party.  Typically something in addition to an unequal bargain was 
required.
111
  My favorite hard bargain case is James v. Morgan (1663).
112
  
A person promised “to pay for a horse a barley-corn a nail, doubling it 
every nail.”
113
  But there were thirty-two nails, and this amounted to 500 
quarters of barley, or 4,000 bushels.
114
  Damages for failure to pay for the 
horse were alleged.
115
  On the general plea of non assumpsit, the court 
directed the jury to give 8 pounds in damages, which it did, a result that 
was confirmed on appeal.
116
  The case shows that the law courts in 
assumpsit cases were fully capable at a very early period of dealing with 
                                                          
 107. See Ricks, supra note 86, at 717–23 (tracing the origin of mutual mistake from English 
equity reports through the development of the complete doctrine in the Virginia courts between 1798 
and 1823); id. at 723–47 (showing the tie between mutual mistake and consideration). 
 108. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 51, 1823 WL 1011 (1823). 
 109. Id. at 66. 
 110. See, e.g., Sturlyn v. Albany, (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 327, 328 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 67, 67 (“[F]or 
when a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to 
ground an action . . . .”). 
 111. See IBBETSON, supra note 85, at 210–11; J.L. Barton, The Enforcement of Hard Bargains, 
103 L.Q. R. 118, 118–21 (1987). 
 112. (1663) 83 Eng. Rep. 323, 1 Lev. 111. 
 113. Id. at 323.  
 114. Id.  For the measurement, see MASTER FITZHERBERT, THE BOOK OF HUSBANDRY 21 
(Walter W. Skeat ed., Trubner & Co. 1882) (1534),  available at  
http://archive.org/stream/bookofhusbandry00fitzuoft/bookofhusbandry00fitzuoft_djvu.txt  (“and if 
it . . . be all beanes, it wyll haue foure London busshelles fullye, and that is half a quarter”); see also, 
e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY quarter n.1,  available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/156027?rskey=wRoo4Y&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
 115. James, 83 Eng. Rep. at 323. 
 116. Id. 
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hard bargains.
117
  In this case as in others I have read from the period 
there is almost surely some trickery involved.  No one who has doubled 
an amount thirty-two times would agree to such a bargain.  One can 
almost see the horse-seller turn and wink at his farrier while making the 
deal.  We infer, as surely the court did, that the seller took advantage of 
the buyer’s mathematical ignorance. 
In the chancery, the deal might have been rescinded,
118
 or equitable 
relief denied.
119
  The word unconscionable stems ultimately from the 
name of the chancellor’s jurisdiction.  The chancellor was the keeper of 
the king’s conscience.  Pleas for relief from agreements on grounds of 
actions contrary to conscience occur from at least the 1400s.
120
  By the 
1700s, relief for a specific form of bad behavior in forming agreements 
was regular and well-established.  In the chancery, it appears that 
something more than an unequal bargain was required to warrant 
relief.
121
  So Chancellor Hardwicke said in a case in 1741:  
It is not sufficient to set aside an agreement in this court, to suggest 
weakness and indiscretion in one of the parties who has engaged in it; 
for, supposing it to be in fact a very hard and unconscionable bargain, if 
a person will enter into it with his eyes open, equity will not relieve him 
upon this footing only, unless he can shew fraud in the party 
contracting with him, or some undue means made use of to draw him 
into such an agreement . . . .
122
 
Even at the rhetoric’s most generous turn, the chancellor wants to 
insist on something more than a mere hard bargain, but it’s very difficult 
to tell what that might be, and the language the chancellor used allows all 
of that “something more” to be implied.  So, for instance, Hardwicke 
                                                          
 117. See also Thornborough v. Whitacre, 87 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1044, 6 Mod. 305, 305 (holding on 
facts similar to those of James v. Morgan, “Per Curiam, . . . : let them go to trial; and though this 
would amount to a vast quantity, yet the jury will consider of the folly of the defendant, and give but 
reasonable damages against him . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., Berney v. Pitt, (1686) 23 Eng. Rep. 620, 621 (Ch.), 2 Vern. 14, 15–16 
(discharging a prior decree based on the “unconscionableness of the bargain”). 
 119. See, e.g., Barnardiston v. Lingood, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 484, 484–85 (Ch.), 2 Atk. 133, 134; 
Nott v. Hill, (1683, 1687) 23 Eng. Rep. 391, 392 (Ch.), 1 Vern. 167, 168. 
 120. See, e.g., Burton v. Gryville, (1420–22) 10 SELDEN SOC. 118, 119 (case no. 121) (Ch.) 
(petition “as law and conscience demand” that the Chancellor order the return of Alice Wodelocke, 
age 7, Burton’s ward, who was being kept by Gryville and Robert Archer in order to induce Burton 
to pay 40 marks and also release Archer’s debts to Burton); JACKSON, supra note 91, app. of cases 
(transcriptions of petitions from Chancery in the 1400s, many of which end in a plea for action for 
conscience’s sake). 
 121. See Barton, supra note 111, at 123–30. 
 122. Willis v. Jernegan, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 555, 555 (Ch.), 2 Atk. 251, 251–52. 
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said in a later case, “There are also hard unconscionable bargains, which 
have been construed fraudulent, and there are instances where even the 
common law hath relieved for this reason expressly.”
123
  The bargaining 
naughtiness was a construction from the hard bargain.  Hardwicke 
claimed equity would engage in this construction more readily than 
would law: “[T]his court will relieve against presumptive fraud, so that 
equity goes further than the rule of law, for there fraud must be proved, 
and not presumed only.”
124
  So, where the court granted relief, “fraud has 
been constantly presumed, or inferred from circumstances, and 
conditions of parties; weakness and necessity on one side, and extortion 
and avarice on the other, and merely from the intrinsic 
unconscionableness of the bargain.”
125
  The chancellor assured from his 
actions that he would actually look in a real case for any bargaining 
disability or naughtiness.
126
  All this rhetoric, including its ambiguity, 
sounds remarkably like our unconscionability defense today.
127
 
                                                          
 123. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 26 Eng. Rep. 191, 224 (Ch.), 1 Atk. 301, 351. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 225. 
 126. See id. (“And yet I do admit more circumstances appear here in favour of the [creditor], 
than have concurred in the rest of the cases: Mr. Spencer was 30 years of age, there is no foundation 
to say he was a weak man, nor any charge in the bill of that kind, the bargain was unsought for by 
the defendant, and intirely [sic] proceeding from the borrower, who was of a broken constitution; the 
money too was borrowed for an honest purpose, to pay debts . . . .”). 
 127. In fact, Lord Hardwicke’s language was quoted in the United States as late as 1930.  See 
Sullivan v. Murphy, 232 N.W. 267, 270 (Iowa 1930); Butler v. Haskell, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) 651, 
684 (1817).  Language much like his is abundant in unconscionability cases, however.  See Lovey v. 
Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 881–82 (Idaho 2003) (“Courts do not possess the roving 
power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable.  Equity may intervene to change 
the terms of a contract if the unconscionable conduct is serious enough to justify the court’s 
interference.  ‘While a court of equity will not relieve a party from a bargain merely because of 
hardship, yet he [or she] may claim the interposition of the court if an unconscionable advantage has 
been taken of his [or her] necessity or weakness.’  It is not sufficient, however, that the contractual 
provisions appear unwise or their enforcement may seem harsh.” (citations omitted)); see also, e.g., 
Day v. DB Capital Group, LLC, No. DKC 10–1658, 2011 WL 887554, at *15 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 
2011) (“In Maryland and elsewhere the prevailing view is that both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability must be present for a court to invalidate a contract or clause under the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  Procedural unconscionability focuses on the bargaining process that led to the 
formation of the contract and ‘looks much like fraud or duress.’  Substantive unconscionability 
‘involves those one-sided terms of a contract from which a party seeks relief.’” (citations omitted)); 
Cowbell, LLC v. Borc Bldg. & Leasing Corp., 328 S.W.3d 399, 405–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“A 
contract is found unconscionable where it is so strongly, grossly, and manifestly unequal that 
someone with common sense would exclaim at the inequality of it.  However, ‘[i]nequality in value 
between the subject matter and the price, standing alone, does not rise to the level of 
unconscionability which requires the refusal of specific performance.’  Rather, we determine 
whether an agreement is unconscionable in view of the circumstances in which the contract was 
made.  Inadequate consideration will not mandate the denial of specific performance ‘unless 
accompanied by other inequitable incidents or unless the disparity is so gross as to show fraud.’” 
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In short, the doctrine of unconscionability was well-developed before 
assent became part of the law.  These defenses all began and developed 
as defenses against a bargain, not against mere assent. 
II.  DEFENSES AGAINST CONSIDERATION: DOCTRINE, LOGIC, AND 
POLICY 
It is no accident that these defenses arose when a prima facie case for 
promise enforcement depended primarily on consideration, and assent 
doctrines had not yet been formulated.  The defenses all do more than 
undercut assent.  In fact, the defenses are best understood as undercutting 
not assent but consideration.  Assent is incomplete as a rationale for 
these defenses. 
A. What Consideration Is For 
Demonstrating how the defenses match consideration from the 
standpoint of policy and logic requires a discussion of the policies served 
by the consideration doctrine.  The justification for our contract 
formation defenses is easier to see if we keep in mind why consideration 
was and is required.  I find consideration so poorly defended today that 
the reasons for it are easy to miss,
128
 but the doctrine developed for 
reasons, and few of them are merely historical.  Of course, in the 
beginning, the point of an extra element in an assumpsit action was to 
                                                          
(citations omitted)); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (“The 
primary focus, however, appears to be relatively clear: substantial disparity in bargaining power 
combined with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the party with the greater power may result 
in a contract or contractual provision being unconscionable.  Unconscionability may involve 
deception, compulsion, or lack of genuine consent, although usually not to the extent that would 
justify rescission under the principles applicable to that remedy.  The substantive fairness of the 
challenged terms is always an essential issue.”); cf. PERILLO, supra note 8, § 9.40; FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 4, § 4.28. 
 128. Exceptions exist in which consideration is given more of its due.  See Peter Benson, The 
Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Edwin 
Butterfoss & H. Allen Blair, Where is Emily Litella When You Need Her?: The Unsuccessful Effort 
to Craft a General Theory of Obligation of Promise for Benefit Received, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
385, 420–26 (2010); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. 
L. REV. 821 (1997) (defending a quite limited argument for caution about “simple donative 
promises”); David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing the 
Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299 (2006); Daniel 
Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).  I find all of these quite 
ethereal.  My interest is in consideration as a functioning legal doctrine, not as an instantiation of 
grand social theory.  Grand social theory is an interesting activity, but its abstractions are so . . . 
well . . . abstract. 
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distinguish the action from one sounding in covenant or debt, so that the 
forms of action did not overlap.
129
  This reason is now obsolete, but it 
became obsolete in part in 1605 or a decade or two thereafter, when 
nearly all the judges came around to the position in Slade’s Case
130
 that 
some actions that could be brought in debt could also be brought in 
assumpsit.
131
  It became entirely obsolete in the 1800s when the forms of 
action were abolished in most states.  Judges kept the consideration 
doctrine, however, for the last four hundred years despite several 
opportunities to abandon it.
132
  The simplest explanation is that judges 
still want it. 
Readers on this issue should remember, though, that consideration as 
a doctrine has been rationalized extremely slowly.  Explanations for it 
were in their infancy in the late 1800s when Holmes first addressed it 
and attacked it,
133
 and the feeling for decades afterwards was that 
consideration might well become a formality and dissolve away like the 
seal.
134
  Only later did scholars begin to defend the doctrine, and then 
only half-heartedly.
135
  Only lately have its defenders begun to 
outnumber its detractors in print.
136
  Eventually, I believe explanations 
                                                          
 129. See Ibbetson, supra note 13, at 142–51. 
 130. (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B.), 4 Co. Rep. 91a.  The case arose in the King’s Bench but 
was decided by agreement of judges from the Common Pleas and Exchequer, also. 
 131. See David Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context, 4 O.J.L.S. 
295 (1984). 
 132. For instance, judges could have abandoned it by following Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 97 
Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B.), 3 Burr. 1663; or when the forms of action were abolished; or when the first 
Restatement of Contracts proposed to turn it into a formality; or when deciding whether to abandon 
the seal; or slowly by judicial decision.  See Ricks, supra note 1, Part III.B.2.  But they did not.  See 
id. 
 133. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 289–307. 
 134. See, e.g., Clarence D. Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration, 26 HARV. L. REV. 429, 429 
(1913) (“It is further true that consciously or not the law of consideration is being modified 
gradually, until the present technical requirement is likely to be entirely abolished.”); Arthur Linton 
Corbin, Non-binding Promises as Consideration, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 556 (1926) (“[T]he time 
has come to abandon the requirement of a consideration . . . .”); see also Kevin M. Teeven, The 
Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 289, 
292–335 (2002). 
 135. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799–800 (1941); 
see also, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1958). 
 136. Compare LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION (Sixth Interim Report, Cmd. 5449, 1937) (law reform commission 
report recommending that the consideration doctrine be abolished in the United Kingdom), and 
James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 986 
(1990), and James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 283 (1991), and Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 
YALE L.J. 621, 643–46 (1919), and Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests of Substance—Promised 
Advantages, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1946), and Malcolm P. Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 
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will settle around a consensus, but belated recognition that the doctrine is 
not going away has delayed clear thinking about the issue. 
The consideration doctrine makes sense, and makes most sense, 
when its operation in the law—its use—is kept firmly in mind.  Only 
then is the consideration doctrine’s necessity obvious. 
The doctrine of consideration operates almost exclusively as a 
measure to judge the adequacy of the plaintiff’s complaint.  The plaintiff 
files a complaint that alleges the elements of a breach of contract claim.  
The judge in response must decide whether to require the defendant to 
answer, or, if the defendant does not appear, whether to receive proof 
from the plaintiff of a prima facie case and issue default judgment. 
At this point in the contract litigation proceeding, if the parties’ 
assent stood alone, without the element of consideration, then the law 
would have little reason to act on the plaintiff’s case to require an answer 
or give default judgment.  Perhaps some would argue that the law ought 
to trust everyone’s assent, because people are entitled to their dignity 
under the law.  But I suspect they do not seriously mean this in this 
context.  Suppose a complaint is filed alleging that the defendant 
assented to pay $5,000 to the plaintiff and has not paid.  The complaint 
alleges that the plaintiff assented to this other assent, but of course the 
plaintiff assented to this promise in the plaintiff’s interest.  We can 
assume, because the lawsuit was thought necessary, that the defendant 
has not paid.  Should a court without further inquiry grant such a 
complaint?  I hope not.  Put yourself in the position of a trial judge.  The 
plaintiff alleges that the defendant assented to pay $5,000 and has not.  
That is all you know.  Should that be enough to form a prima facie case 
for an enforceable promise?
137
 
I hope you answer not.  A state’s response to a legal complaint is 
                                                          
COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1941), and Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections 
on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Wessman, Retaining 
the Gatekeeper], and Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the 
Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993) [hereinafter Wessman, Should We Fire 
the Gatekeeper?], and Lord Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the 
Common Law?, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1936), with Benson, supra note 128, and Howard 
Engelskirchen, Consideration as the Commitment to Relinquish Autonomy, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 
490 (1997), and Fuller, supra note 135, and Gamage & Kedem, supra note 128, and Markovits, 
supra note 128, and Patterson, supra note 135, and Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of 
Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 (2000). 
 137. As Professor Corbin said it, “Should the Requirement of Consideration be Abandoned?  
Perhaps the question here put is substantially the same as, Should all promises be enforced.  If it is 
the same, there is little use in putting it.  By no system of law have all promises been enforced.”  
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUME EDITION § 111 (1952). 
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costly.  The plaintiff is asking you to bring the machinery of the state to 
bear against a (normally) taxpaying, law-abiding citizen.  Is the mere fact 
of assent enough for you to send the sheriff out?  The mere assent of a 
party should not be sufficient to warrant the state’s moving to action 
against them, both because the state’s machinery ought to require more 
in the way of publicly plausible reasonableness and also because the 
state’s machinery ought not to be used for solely private purposes.  
Leaving the law of contracts solely to assent would violate both of these 
principles. 
Please keep in mind also that a legal complaint is not filed until the 
parties cannot solve the dispute on their own.  We can generally assume 
that the plaintiff has already asked the defendant to perform, and that the 
defendant has declined while knowing that the plaintiff will be marching 
off to court to get a judge to order payment.  Some defendants delay 
performance just to put the plaintiff to the cost of suit, but most do not.  
Presumably there is some reason why the defendant has not paid.  If you 
conclude that the promise is binding on evidence of the promise alone, 
have you not assumed already that the defendant is wrong, and thus 
prejudged the case?  Should you not know something more about the 
reasonableness or quality of the assent before you order it answered or 
grant damages for its breach? 
Consideration when added to the fact of promise means that the 
promise has been proved reasonable enough to enforce to the extent of 
requiring an answer or a default judgment.  It also proves enough of a 
public benefit to call the state’s machinery into action.  Of course, that 
seldom ends the inquiry.  In the face of actual evidence of duress, 
misrepresentation, mistake, unconscionability, the non-occurrence of a 
condition, or the inappropriateness of a remedy, the court will reconsider 
that prima facie judgment.  But at the stage of the inquiry in which it 
operates, the consideration doctrine requires enough proof that court 
action is worth the public’s time and the violence that a court proceeding 
and judgment might work against a private citizen. 
Most of this was spelled out in the sixteenth century when litigation 
in the central courts, in which the consideration doctrine operated, was 
limited to an examination of the prima facie case and to appeals after 
trial.  At the time, the doctrine of consideration was justified on several 
grounds.  For instance, consideration for a promise helped ensure that the 
promise was reasonable.  Christopher St. German stated in describing 
promises that were unenforceable under the common law of contract in 
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1530, “These be called naked promises, because there is nothing 
assigned why they should be made.”
138
  Reason clothed a promise.  
Common lawyers adopted the nudity metaphor soon after the 
consideration doctrine formed,
139
 letting consideration fill the 
justificatory slot St. German had named. 
As the doctrine was maturing in the 1560s, Fleetwood and Wray 
(later Wray, C.J. of the King’s Bench) argued that the common law 
“requires that there should be a new cause, whereof the country [jurors] 
may have intelligence or knowledge for the trial of it, if need be, so that 
it is necessary for the public-weal.”
140
  The acts which result in liability 
ought to be notorious, they argued, like livery of seisin.
141
  In other 
words, at a minimum the deal had to be public in some way.  We might 
take this in two ways, depending on what it is Fleetwood and Wray 
wanted the public to know—the cause of the promise or action, on the 
one hand, or merely the fact of the promise itself (that the promise 
occurred). 
If they meant that the cause of the promise or action must be public, 
then consideration was for this reason (also) a kind of reasonableness 
standard: It ensured that the cause of the promise or the lawsuit be 
publicly understandable, plausible to the public.  The courts actually 
followed such a standard in several cases.
142
  The doctrine conceived this 
way is a check on reasonableness as St. German advocated, but one less 
stringent than a finding of actual reasonableness.  A benefit to the 
promisor or a detriment to the promisee provided just such a public 
reason, either for a promise or for liability, and the requirement of mutual 
inducement tied the promise and reason together.  “For our Law 
requireth in all contractes a mutuall consideration,” Fulbecke explained 
in 1602, “and one part of the contract challengeth and begetteth the 
other.”
143
  And that requirement avoids liability arising from things 
                                                          
 138. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1530), reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC. 1, 
228, 229 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974), as reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 
63, at 484.  
 139. E.g., Goodwin v. Willoughby, (1626) 79 Eng. Rep. 1273, 1273 (K.B.), Pop. 177, 177; 
Lampleigh v. Brathwait, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 255, 255 (C.P.), Hob. 105, 106; Sydenham & 
Worlington’s Case, (1585) 78 Eng. Rep. 20, 20 (C.P.), Godb. 31, 31. 
 140. Sharington v. Strotton, (1565) 75 Eng. Rep. 454, 460 (K.B.), 1 Pl. Com. 298, 302. 
 141. Id. 
 142. E.g., Riches v. Bridges, (1602) 78 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1108 (K.B. & Ex. Ch.), Cro. Eliz. 883, 
884, 80 Eng. Rep. 4, Yel. 4 (from Croke: “it shall be intended that he had some benefit thereby”); 
Reynolds v. Pinhowe, (1594) 78 Eng. Rep. 669, 669 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 429, 429 (holding 
consideration enough on a benefit that “may be there”). 
 143. WILLIAM FULBECKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE PARALLELE, OR CONFERENCE OF THE 
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people do “of their owne head,” he explains.
144
 
Alternately, if Fleetwood and Wray were talking about the cause 
being evidence of the promise itself, or at least an intent to be bound, 
then consideration serves for this purpose as a formality that proves a 
promise or that intent.  This purpose is roughly equivalent to what Fuller 
later called consideration’s “evidentiary function.”
145
  As an 
interpretation of Fleetwood and Wray,
146
 I think this doubtful, but Fuller 
is quite right that consideration as a formality would provide additional 
evidence that a promise was made, and he has Mansfield, C.J., in Pillans 
v. Van Mierop
147
 to back him up, for what that is worth. 
Fuller also posited something he called “channeling function.”
148
  
Consideration, he claimed, “furnishes a simple and external test of 
enforceability.”
149
  This also, in fact, may have been what Fleetwood and 
Wray were arguing for in the 1560s,
150
 and consideration certainly fills 
this function.  But it does not do it very well.  It is not simple.  The 
general rule requiring a bargained-for promise or performance has 
exceptions and corollaries that must be learned if the lawyer is to 
understand and apply the doctrine correctly.  Certainly there is 
justification for the length as well as the existence of Chapter 4 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  And we should not expect juries to 
understand consideration well.  Law students barely grasp it, even when 
it is taught to them at length, and judges, too, make contradictory 
statements regarding it.
151
  Moreover, a seal is so much better at this 
function.  A plain signed writing would have been so much better, or 
some other public ceremony.  This makes us doubt Fuller’s argument. 
In the same case in which Fleetwood and Wray argued, Plowden for 
                                                          
CIUILL LAW, THE CANON LAW, AND THE COMMON LAW OF THIS REALME OF ENGLAND 18b 
(London, Thomas Wight ed., 1602). 
 144. Id. at 19.  Fulbecke’s first example is Hunt v. Bate, (1568) 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (C.P.), 3 Dy. 
272a, in which liability for the defendant’s promise is denied on the ground that the promisee had 
incurred the detriment “of his own head” rather than because he was induced by the promise.  Id. at 
606.  A public reason was wanting.  The alleged consideration in Hunt also occurred before the 
promise was made, so the case is also rationalized as a past consideration case, time analysis 
functioning as a surrogate for causation.  Id. 
 145. Fuller, supra note 135, at 799–800. 
 146. Fuller cited Sharington v. Strotton.  See supra note 135, at 799 n.2. 
 147. (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1038 (K.B.), 3 Burr. 1663, 1669 (Mansfield, J.) (“I take it, that 
the ancient notion about the want of consideration was for the sake of evidence only . . . .”). 
 148. Fuller, supra note 135, at 801. 
 149. Id.  
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 140–44. 
 151. See, e.g., Ricks, supra note 1, Part III.B.2.e (discussing the peppercorn jurisprudence). 
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the opposing party proposed another rationale.  The purpose of a sealed 
document, he argued, is “because words are oftentimes spoken by men 
unadvisedly and without deliberation.”
152
  So the law enforces sealed 
documents “without examining upon what cause or consideration they 
were made.”
153
  The implicit premise in the distinction is that an 
examination of consideration is meant to ensure the reasonableness of the 
deal—at least that the deal’s wisdom is plausible.  But Plowden appeared 
willing to equate consideration with the formality of a seal.  This is the 




But there are other substantive justifications for the doctrine.  For 
instance, requiring mutual inducement means that the law favors 
beneficial transactions.
155
  Neither party would be induced by a 
transaction unless each saw it as in her best interests, with benefits 
outweighing costs.  That’s what inducement means.  A transaction in 
which both parties benefit is economically better for them, and I mean 
that in the broad sense that it will increase their utility.  It is also 
economically better for society, at least in theory, as it moves goods or 
services to those who value them more highly than those who possess 
them before the transaction.  So everyone, assuming these kinds of 
transactions are encouraged equally for all, is or can be more satisfied 
than before.  Enforcing a transaction in which both parties benefit is also 
morally superior, or at least morally less problematic, than enforcing a 
transaction in which one party benefits and the other does not or, worse, 
merely suffers a detriment.  Of course, consideration does not require 
that both parties actually benefit, but the mutual inducement requirement 
means that, ex ante, both parties must see plausible benefits from the 
transaction that could outweigh the costs of entering into it. 
The consideration doctrine also ensures that reason for a lawsuit 
exists, and points to a proper remedial measure.  When benefit to the 
promisor exists as consideration, this reason alone, independent of other 
reasons for contract enforcement, suggests that a promisor should be 
bound.  After receiving a bargained-for benefit, the promisor would be 
enriched unjustly unless made to perform or pay.  As between giving up 
                                                          
 152. Sharington v. Strotton, (1565) 75 Eng. Rep. 454, 470 (K.B.), 1 Pl. Com. 298, 308. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Fuller, supra note 135, at 800. 
 155. Something like this is asserted at Charles J. Geotz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: 
An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1293–97 & passim (1980); see also 
EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 71–82. 
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the benefit and performing the promise given in exchange for the benefit 
(or paying damages for its breach), the remedy focused on the promise 
would generally hew more closely to the parties’ understanding of the 
transaction, and should normally govern.  When it does, it reflects the 
strength of the exchange concept. 
When benefit to the promisor does not exist but the promise has 
induced some performance which itself induced the promise, then the 
promisee should be reimbursed for the costs of that performance, both 
for reliance and lost opportunity.  The exchange of the promise for the 
performance makes the performance worthy of reimbursement.  As for 
remedy, the value of the bargained-for promise is the best guide to what 
the parties thought was the value of that performance, and, as with 
benefit, is for that reason a preferable measure of the harm done to the 
promisee over the actual costs of performance, or the costs of lost 
opportunity (often difficult to prove), though these together might work 
as an alternative.
156
  In fact, the value of the bargained-for promise is the 
remedy most closely aligned with the market for that deal at the time the 
deal occurred, which is why giving an expectation measure better assures 
that incentives to rely on bargains continue to exist. 
Similar rationales exist for enforcing mere mutual promises.  If one 
of the two exchanged promises is performed before breach of the other, 
then the benefit or detriment, or both, resulting from performance 
provides sufficient ground alone for enforcement of the promise.  But if 
breach occurs after a trade of mutual promises but before any 
performance has occurred, the fact of exchange alone supports 
enforcement.  Much ink has been spilled on whether executory mutual 
promises should be enforceable,
157
 but for the most part, this situation is 
not different from the others.  The same trade of promise and 
consideration occurred here as occurred in other cases, so the rationality 
of the promise and the public benefits from its enforcement are 
sufficiently evidenced by proof of the bargain.  The so-called cautionary 
function is equally served.  We have no less reason here to believe that 
the parties have, from an ex ante perspective, chosen a mutually 
beneficial outcome, and in a morally superior way.  The bargain also 
                                                          
 156. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.3. 
 157. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 4, at 7–27 (making an argument from autonomy); MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 164–68 (1993) (claiming enforcement is 
based on efficiency); Engelskirchen, supra note 136 (also autonomy); Val D. Ricks, In Defense of 
Mutuality of Obligation: Why “Both Should Be Bound, or Neither”, 78 NEB. L. REV. 491, 530 n.184 
(1999) (an argument from custom). 
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gives guidance on what would constitute a proper remedy.  The only 
thing missing is direct harm, but only the fortuity of early breach has 
stopped it from occurring. 
From the judge’s standpoint, the lack of direct harm is not a serious 
objection.  The law presumes that both promises are generally 
enforceable as part of the bargain, and this resolves the issue for the most 
part.
158
  If a plaintiff is able to recover from the breaching defendant, 
then the defendant should be able to recover from the plaintiff (or at least 
the lack of the plaintiff’s performance should mitigate damages).  If one 
promise is enforceable, then, at least ex ante, all else being equal, the 
other should be; the law’s commitment to treat the parties equally 
requires it.
159
  Once the law decides to enforce one promise, the law 
could hardly refuse to enforce the other and remain fair.  The bargain ties 
the two parties’ promises together in such a way that enforcing one 
requires that the other be treated equally, so once we make one 
bargained-for promise enforceable, the other should be as well.
160
  This is 
the policy origin of the often-maligned but (when understood) salutary 
mutuality of obligation rule.
161
  After all, the parties’ bargain implies that 
they themselves thought the trade worth doing.  Making both promises 
enforceable allows the law to catch the public benefits of bargaining 
without offending anyone’s interests.
162
 
                                                          
 158. Ricks, supra note 157 & passim.  
 159. Of course, this is true only in a general sense.  One potential exception occurs when the 
plaintiff’s promise is subject to some defense, such as the statute of frauds or one of the formation 
defenses.  The plaintiff’s promise then might never be legally enforceable.  Courts have often 
enforced the defendant’s promise nonetheless.  Id. at 511–15, 526, nn.105–20.  The defendant should 
not, after all, be able to take advantage of the plaintiff’s defense.  Another exception occurs when the 
contract calls for only one performance, as in certain legal gambling contracts (a bet on a race, for 
example).  Consideration in a gambling contract is the mutual promise, but after the event bet on 
occurs, only one party need perform; the other merely collects the money.  Where legal, this is an 
exception to the general policy.  Id. at 506–07, n.85.   
 160. Id. at 516–41. 
 161. Id. at 517–30. 
 162. Historically, the law developed so that enforcement of one of two executory mutual 
promises happens very rarely.  Early on, the two promises were each enforceable independently 
based on the bargain, regardless of whether either of the parties had performed.  See, e.g., Nicholas 
v. Raynbred, (1615) 145 Eng. Rep. 215, 216 (Ex. Ch.), Jenk. 296, 296 (also reported at 80 Eng. Rep. 
238, Hob. 88); Gower v. Capper, (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 790, 790 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 543, 543 (also 
reported at 74 Eng. Rep. 1029, Noy 61); SIMPSON, supra note 15, at 461–65.  That changed with 
Kingston v. Preston, (K.B. 1773), reported within Jones v. Barkley, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 434, 437–
38 (K.B.), when the default rule shifted to finding one promise a constructive condition of the other, 
meaning that generally a promisee who has not yet performed must tender before alleging breach.  
See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.9.  The consequence is that generally one of two mutual 
promisors performs or at least tenders before suit. 
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A similar answer to the objection (that, in a case of mutually 
executory promises, no direct harm exists) is that direct harm does exist; 
the objection is simply incorrect.  Breach of a bargained-for promise is 
(or should be) itself a compensable harm.  This conclusion is premised 
on the notion that each side of a bargain is related transitively to the other 
side.  This premise is derived from the parties’ trading them for each 
other; the parties (at least) think of them as equivalent, or at least not less 
than each other.  That is a logical consequence of a requirement of 
mutual inducement.  Thus, a bargained-for performance (performed) 
warrants enforcement of a bargained-for promise. 
If a bargained-for performance (performed) warrants enforcement of 
a bargained-for promise, then a bargained-for promise also warrants a 
bargained-for performance.  That is why we do justice to the non-
breaching party who has performed when we give them a remedy based 
on their expectation that the other party’s promise would be performed.  
If the bargained-for promise did not warrant their performance, then we 
would be over- or under-compensating with an expectation remedy.  The 
performance justifies enforcing the promise, but enforcing the promise 
justifes, ex post, the bargained-for performance.  If that is so, then a 
bargained-for promise certainly justifies, both ex ante and ex post, a 
bargained-for promise given in return.   
In other words, if the law enforces bargains in which one party has 
performed, it must enforce both sides.  And if a bargained-for promise 
also warrants a bargained-for performance, then the bargained-for 
promise of the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff has not yet performed, 
also warrants a similar remedy. 
Give the exchange its full due.  The parties have exchanged 
promises.  If we credit the judgment that goes into inducement—if the 
parties really are minimally reasonable—and that justifies their promise 
such that the performance warrants enforcement of the promise on the 
other side of the bargain, then it ought to work for mutual promises, too.  
Put still another way, if a promise can be one half of an enforceable 
bargain, and in that space considered equal to the other half of the 
bargain in the eyes of the parties and derivatively under the law, then 
promises can also serve as both halves of an enforceable bargain. 
One point gleaned from this examination of benefit, detriment, and 
mutual promise can be stated another way.  The requirement of an 
exchange frees the courts from examining the quality of assent, at least 
without further reason to do so.  If the parties have exchanged, then 
prima facie what they are trading is roughly equivalent, at least in the 
parties’ eyes, and they are the people whose interests are most relevant to 
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both the transaction and the litigation.  They are also the people who 
know the deal best.  The fact of their exchange thus suggests that the deal 
is good.  Alternately, we can conclude that the parties themselves have 
conceded by exchanging that the deal is good for each of them, and that 
the promise is roughly equal in value in their eyes to the consideration, 
which is the price extracted for it. 
There is a final set of interests served by the consideration doctrine 
that differs from the others.  Before discussing it, I wish to remind 
readers that one can talk about contract law’s substance without 
mentioning assent at all.  Contract law, with consideration playing its full 
conceptual role, is not based on mere assent but on promise.  In the 
hypothetical above, I was trying to focus on assent for the benefit of 
those who do, so I wrote the silly phrase “assented to pay,” but no one 
talks this way normally, and I am not sure the phrase has a meaning 
unless it means a promise to pay.  A promise is required, though 
evidence of it can include any variety of conduct or assent to such 
conduct so long as a promise is expressed or implied.  The assent 
doctrine forgets this or at least makes no mention of it, and so we appear 
to require theorists to remind us that some kind of promise is necessary 
(at least they keep reminding us
163
).  The consideration doctrine, on the 
other hand, requires consideration for a promise, so the focus is where it 
should be, on the promise that was breached. 
Once we remember that a promise is required, there is another reason 
for keeping the consideration doctrine, and that is that lack of 
consideration is in some cases a worthy ground for non-enforcement.  
Given that consideration builds the prima facie case our law should 
require, the lack of it should sometimes be a defense.  I believe there is 
wide agreement on many case lines (though not all) that a correct result 
is reached when courts decline to enforce a promise because 
consideration is lacking.  Our common law of contracts handles these as 
consideration cases and not under any other doctrine, and if we were to 
do away with the consideration doctrine we would have to find another 
place for them. 
The relatively recent Kim v. Son
164
 is a good example.  Son was the 
                                                          
 163. E.g., FRIED, supra note 4, at 1; Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and 
Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).  Lest we be confused between the morality of 
promising and what happens in a contract, Professor Pratt denotes it an “undertaking.”  Michael G. 
Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008). 
 164. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009). 
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majority shareholder of a couple of corporations.
165
  After months of 
investigation, Kim loaned money to the corporations.
166
  The 
corporations defaulted, and Kim lost his investment.
167 
 Son and Kim 
later met in a restaurant, where a drunken Son, full of remorse for Kim’s 
loss, asked a waiter for a pin.
168
  Son pricked his finger and wrote out in 
blood, “I will repay you to the best of my ability.”
169
  There was no 
question that Son had made a serious promise to pay Kim back.  The 
promise was not unclear: the amount owed Kim was a liquidated sum.
170
  
Clearly, Son assented. 
But Son was not the borrower; and the court refused to enforce the 
promise
171
—quite rightly, I believe.  Son did not owe this money, and the 
law does not enforce such promises merely because they were said, even 
when said seriously and assented to by the promisee.
172
  Nor does 
morality require it; Kim invested in the corporations, and giving Kim 
also the benefit of a post hoc guarantee would give him more than he 
bargained for.  Nor, because the promise occurred after the loan and 
default, would welfare be served by enforcing Son’s promise.  In fact, 
given that Son had been drinking and was feeling guilt and the 
obligations of friendship very strongly that day,
173 
we should suspect that 
his promise would serve no one’s welfare, including his own.  Nor is 
freedom curtailed by the law’s refusing to enforce the promise: If Son 
really wants to pay, he still can.  He just cannot be made to abide by his 
promise to pay, and that is because contract is actually grounded in 
consideration—some reasonableness or at least plausible wisdom for the 
promise, not just in assent. 
I suspect most of us would agree that Son should not be made to pay, 
but it is not clear that any argument other than lack of consideration 
would have saved him, which is why the case centered around that 
doctrine.  No matter whether one agrees or disagrees with other 
corollaries of the consideration rule—the proscription against pre-
existing contractual or non-contractual legal duties serving as 
                                                          
 165. Id. at *1. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at *2–3. 
 172. Id. at *1.  
 173. Id. 
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consideration,
174
 the need for a settlement to be based on more than an 
obviously empty legal claim, the illusory promise rule, the past 
consideration rule, etc.—if one agrees with any case decided under any 
of these doctrines, then one has to admit a place for the consideration 
requirement or make up another doctrine to replace it.  I doubt any other 
doctrine could handle these situations as efficiently as consideration 
does, so unless the consideration doctrine is generating results that are 
not only wrong but very costly, and the cost-benefit calculation would 
change significantly if the problems were handled by some other rule, I 
propose we stick with the consideration doctrine for these cases. 
To sum up, on the issue of what the consideration doctrine does and 
is for—the old cases may teach us.  In Gower v. Capper (1596),
175
 a 
debtor promised that, if his creditor would show him the bill proving the 
debt, he would obtain sureties to pay the debt.
176
  He did not obtain 
sufficient sureties, and when he was sued, he complained there was no 
consideration.
177
  The Queen’s Bench responded, “[A] promise against a 
promise is a sufficient ground for an action.”
178
 
“Ground for an action”—that’s key language, it seems to me—not 
“ground for a contract” or “ground for a promise,” but ground for an 
action.  On that issue, the common lawyers seem to have understood 
quite correctly that consideration grounded an action.  Assent alone does 
not.  A defense to an action should take away the ground for the action.  
Because one cannot have consideration without assent, removing assent 
removes consideration, but there is no reason for the defenses to aim 
only at the smaller target.  One can ruin a cake by leaving out other 
                                                          
 174. This rule has been modified, of course, either by a judicial finding of a substitute agreement 
or by fiat.  See, e.g., Watkins & Son, Inc. v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591, 594 (N.H. 1941); Schwartzreich v. 
Bauman-Basch, Inc., 131 N.E. 887, 889–90 (N.Y. 1921).  And the Restatement has recommended a 
change.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 89 (1981); see also Angel v. Murray, 322 
A.2d 630, 636 (R.I. 1974) (using § 89).  And the UCC has jumped in.  U.C.C. § 2-209(1).  These 
variations mostly prove my point, actually.  When courts want to enforce, they do, and the doctrine 
of consideration does not stand in their way.  But when courts do enforce without an exchange, the 
doctrine they adopt ensures that they have before them more than the bare assent of the parties.  The 
reasonableness requirement of Carrig, the substitute contract requirement of Schwartzreich, the 
elements of § 89, and the good faith requirement of the UCC all put before the court the information 
necessary to do what the consideration requirement requires: rule on the plausible reasonableness of 
the promise or a remedy based on it.  Only the UCC makes the modification presumptively 
enforceable, putting the burden on the promisor to show why it was not.  Perhaps in the commercial 
setting the difference is justifiable. 
 175. (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 543. 
 176. Id. at 790. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
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ingredients besides flour.  The ground for an action for breach of contract 
is larger than assent.  It can be attacked by means other than attack on 
assent.  That is what our contract formation defenses do, as the next Part 
II.B shows. 
(Note: I have said nothing about donative promises, but they are 
largely beside the point.  Consideration is a doctrine that includes, not 
excludes: It functions to provide reasons for enforcement, not non-
enforcement (even promises without consideration are enforced if an 
independent ground for enforcement exists).
179
  The doctrine itself does 
not include a distinction between donative and non-donative promises.  If 
donative promises should be enforced, it is for reasons other than 
exchange.  In fact, at common law donative promises that generated 
reasonable action in reliance were enforceable under the doctrine of 
consideration!
180
  And courts could have found other donative promises 
                                                          
 179. But see Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper, supra note 136; Wessman, Should We Fire the 
Gatekeeper?, supra note 136.  Wessman concludes that the consideration doctrine is responsible for 
the non-enforcement of broad classes of promises that should be enforced.  See Wessman, Should 
We Fire the Gatekeeper?, at 102–14.  This conclusion depends in part on the idea that consideration 
is the only way to enforce a promise, but it is not.  Not only do other means of enforcement exist 
within contract law, see, for example RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82–94 (1981), but 
numerous other doctrines assist courts in reaching a just result when necessary, including, for 
example, unjust enrichment, agency law, and tort doctrines of fiduciary duties and assumption of a 
duty.  Second, Wessman’s conclusion depends on the idea that judges are forced by doctrine to 
exclude.  I just do not see judicial ingenuity as so lifeless and judges as so powerless, at least not 
regarding things they care about.  I believe judges do not see the benefits of expanding what counts 
as prima facie enforceable as worth the costs.  
 180. See, e.g., Teeven, supra note 134, at 292–334; William R. Casto & Val D. Ricks, “Dear 
Sister Antillico . . .”: The Story of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 94 GEO. L.J. 321, 366–70 (2006); Ricks, supra 
note 136, at 112–18 (showing this line of cases was based on a fiction but was a clearly established 
line); see also Somers v. Miner, 9 Conn. 458, 466, 1833 WL 54 (1833); Trs. of Amherst Acad. v. 
Cowls, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 427, 431–39 (1828); Trs. of Farmington Acad. v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172, 
175–76, 1817 WL 1876 (1817); Univ. of Vt. v. Buell, 2 Vt. 48, 54–56, 1829 WL 1068 (1829); 
Keyme v. Goulston, (1664) 83 Eng. Rep. 338, 338 (K.B.), 1 Lev. 140, 141; Storer’s Case, (perhaps 
1615) 73 Eng. Rep. 605, 607, 3 Dy. 272a, 272b n.32.  The following passage from Doctor and 
Student (1530) is telling: 
Yf he to whome the promyse ys made: haue a charge by reason of the promyse whyche 
he hathe also perfourmed: than in that case he shall haue an accyon for that thyng that 
was promysed thoughe he that made the promyse haue no worldely profyte by yt.  As yf a 
man saye to an other (heele suche a poore man of hys dyssease/ or mke suche an 
hyghewaye/ and I shall gyue the thus moche/ and yf he do yt I thynke an accyon lyeth at 
the comon lawe.  And more ouer though the thynge that he shall doo be all spyrytuall: 
Yet yf he perfourme yt I thynke an accyon lyeth at the comon lawe. 
CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1530), reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC. 1, 230–31 
(T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974).  Teeven makes the most complete argument I have 
found.  We differ in his conclusion that “detrimental reliance as an independent ground for contract 
relief on informal promises was lost at law.”  Teeven, supra note 134, at 313.  I see no reason for 
that assertion.  There were never many of these cases, and they did not break new ground.  There 
was no explicit rejection of this line of cases.  Atiyah, for one, notes evidence that lawyers still held 
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enforceable without action in reliance, had they wanted to.  For example, 
promises associated with marriage were held enforceable as with 
consideration.
181
  These were undoubtedly often donative, the father 
wanting to benefit the daughter.
182
  Recovery in these cases was often 
rationalized as given on consideration of affection.
183
  The gift was a 
kind of benefit to the father, who owed a natural duty of affection to the 
daughter.  But if the promisor was not a parent of the bride, this rationale 
did not work.
184
  Enforcement in these cases could be rationalized on the 
ground that the promise was made before marriage and induced the 
marriage.
185
  But this rationale depended on one imagining that the 
newlyweds married for money,
186
 and on seeing the marriage as a 
detriment (or at least a costly action) (Coke expressed such a jaded 
view
187
).  Moreover, this use of consideration is no different than 
                                                          
by it.  P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 184–89 (1979).  That lawyers 
in the United States continued this line without much ado, and did so well before the rationalization 
of consideration around bargain that Teeven discusses, suggests that Atiyah is correct to say that this 
kind of idea in the law “never disappeared,” although the idea’s breadth and full meaning were 
uncertain at the time (and Atiyah may or may not have described it accurately).  Id. at 186. 
 181. E.g., Berisford v. Woodruff, (1616) 79 Eng. Rep. 345, 345, Cro. Jac. 404, 404; Applethwait 
v. Nertleys, (1587–88) 74 Eng. Rep. 727, 727, 4 Leo. 56, 57. 
 182. E.g., Crouch v. Givers, (1593) 78 Eng. Rep. 558, 558, Cro. Eliz. 307, 307.  In Crouch, Mr. 
Givers promised Crouch “unum cubiculum,” which Givers’s counsel argued meant the furniture of a 
chamber.  Id.  Perhaps Crouch himself would have been happy with a money judgment instead, but 
the promise probably was of furniture from the bride’s father’s house, and the promise was a gift to 
the daughter. 
 183. See Marsh v. Rainsford, 74 Eng. Rep. 400, 401 (K.B.), 2 Leo. 111, 112 (Wray, J.) (“[H]ere 
the natural affection of the father to his daughter, is sufficient matter of consideration.”); Marsh v. 
Kavenford, 78 Eng. Rep. 319, 320 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 59, 59 (Popham, J.) (“For the father’s natural 
affection doth continue, and her advancement is sufficient cause of the promise.”); Barker v. Halifax, 
(1600) 78 Eng. Rep. 974, 974 (C.P.), Cro. Eliz. 741, 741 (Walmsley, J.) (“[A]n assumpsit in 
consideration that you had married my daughter, to give unto you 40l. was good; for the affection 
and consideration always continues.”). 
 184. In Browne v. Garborough, (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 324, 324 (K.B.), Cro. Eliz. 63, 64, 75 Eng. 
Rep. 1018, 1018, Gould. 94, 94, the promisor was a cousin of the groom, and the promise was made 
to the bride.  The cousin had no reason to get involved except affection, and the judges referred to 
him as a “stranger” to the parties.  Id.  See also Bradley v. Toder, (1609) 79 Eng. Rep. 198, 198, Cro. 
Jac. 228, 80 Eng. Rep. 112, 112, Yel. 168, 168 (another cousin promisor called a “stranger” to the 
marriage). 
 185. Browne, 78 Eng. Rep. at 324 (Gawdy & Schute, J.J.). 
 186. Cardozo in De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917), wrestled with the inducement 
issue arising when a promise is alleged to be given on consideration of marriage.  Rather than hold 
the parties married for money, Cardozo inferred inducement because “the natural consequence of the 
defendant’s promise was to induce.”  Id. at 809. 
 187. Freeman v. Freeman, (1614) 81 Eng. Rep. 327, 327 (K.B.), 1 Rolle. 61, 61, 80 Eng. Rep. 
1113, 1113–14, 2 Bulst. 269, 269–70; see also Ramsden v. Appleyard, (1720) 22 Eng. Rep. 333, 
333, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 390, 391 (“[S]uch a Consideration is good at Law; for tho’ no Profit accrues to 
the Promiser, yet the other Party, without this Promise, would be liable to a Loss or Damage, and 
that is a sufficient Consideration to support an Assumpsit at Common Law.”). 
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occurred with respect to other kinds of donative promise enforceable 
when the promisee takes the actions that the promise was intended to 
induce.  Later, when litigants applied in Chancery for performance of 
marriage settlements, the Chancellor enforced them on consideration of 
marriage, and decided who could benefit from them by asking whether 
the person had suffered a detriment or was related by blood to anyone 
who had.
188
  Certainly something more was happening here than what 
later became known as promissory estoppel, and this was all done in the 
name of consideration. 
The fact is, when judges wanted to enforce donative promises, they 
did, and they used the doctrine of consideration as the means.  We have 
now cut off that line of cases from the consideration doctrine and 
narrowed consideration to exchange,
189
 but it hardly makes sense to cut 
off a line of consideration cases enforcing donative promises and then 
complain that the consideration doctrine does not enforce donative 
promises! 
Moreover, caution should be exercised here.  The argument is often 
phrased not as involving “donative” but “gratuitous” promises.  One 
meaning of gratuitous is “being without apparent reason, cause, or 
justification.”
190
  The law should not enforce such promises, and the 
consideration doctrine, which tries to ensure that there is some plausible 
reason for the promise or for an action on the promise before imposing 
state power to enforce, provides no support for enforcing them, nor 
should it.  At any rate, now we handle donative promises under doctrines 
other than consideration, but that is because we have forgotten the 
reasons for the consideration doctrine and artificially narrowed its 
potential reach.) 
B.  How the Defenses Undercut Consideration 
Duress, misrepresentation, mistake, and unconscionability all 
                                                          
 188. See Sutton v. Chetwynd, (1817) 36 Eng. Rep. 96, 97 (Ch.), 3 Mer. 249, 253; Stephens v. 
Trueman, (1747–48) 27 Eng. Rep. 899, 900 (Ch.), 1 Ves. sen. 73, 74; Osgood v. Stroud, (1724) 88 
Eng. Rep. 839, 840 (Ch.), 10 Mod. 533, 534–35. 
 189. I credit Holmes and Williston for cutting off this line of cases, primarily by explicitly 
reducing consideration to mere bargain.  See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 137, §§ 110–27, 127 (“As is 
insisted herein, in many places, there are many promises that are enforced at law, even though there 
is nothing that is bargained for or given in exchange.  In all such cases, there is some factor that is 
practically always called the ‘consideration’; and it constitutes a reason for enforcement by the 
court.”); Ricks, supra note 136, at 117–18. 
 190. Gratuitous, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gratuitous (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
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undercut these quite substantive reasons for the consideration doctrine as 
well as the formal requirements of consideration itself.  Incidentally, 
undercutting consideration often also undercuts assent.  Since mutual 
inducement is a broader concept than mere assent and presumes mutual 
assent has occurred, anything that erases mutual assent also erases the 
broader mutual inducement.  But the defense doctrines do much more 
than erase mutual assent.  Why should that be, if only assent is at issue?  
That they do more shows that assent is not their target.  For ease of 
discussion, I begin analysis of each defense with doctrinal language from 




Duress occurs when “assent is induced by an improper threat by the 
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.”
192
  The 
Restatement uses the language of assent, but the meat of the duress 
charge is that inducement comes not from the consideration but from the 
threat.  If one was not induced by the consideration, then one is not 
responsible for the benefits received from the other’s performance, nor 
for the other party’s detriment, and one has not admitted that the 
promises are formally equal and publicly beneficial so as to justify an 
action upon them.  The duress doctrine also requires that the victim be 
left “no reasonable alternative.”  The result is that all plausible public 
reason for the deal is gone.  There is no public justification for using the 
machinery of the state to enforce the promise, then. 
Notice, incidentally, that in the Restatement test in particular a 
manifestation of assent still occurs notwithstanding duress.  Actual assent 
is not required for an enforceable promise,
193
 so lack of real, subjective 
assent cannot be relevant to the defense.  The subjective will theory of 
duress used by some courts (and reflective of nineteenth-century 
theorizing) is the anomaly in contract law.  The test that most plausibly 
fits with other contract doctrine is the Restatement’s objective test, but 
the objective test must rest on what occurred in public, and the important 
part of what occurred in public in our contract law is the exchange.  That 
                                                          
 191. For reasons stated in the earlier article, see Ricks, supra note 1, at 597 n.23. I am loathe to 
use the Restatement: “[I]t is a scholars’ summary—and in some cases, a recommendation—rather 
than a treatise.”  But the Restatement’s language is widely used and often widely followed and 
probably is as close to representative as anything else available. 
 192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981). 
 193. E.g., id. §§ 17 cmt. c, 18, 19(3), 21. 
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is what the duress doctrine undercuts. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the Restatement’s position that 
some threats are only improper if the “resulting exchange is not on fair 
terms.”
194
  This has no relevance to assent directly.  I have heard it 
related in an indirect way (“an unfair exchange suggests lack of assent”), 
but the simpler explanation is that, if the exchange is unfair, the 
substantive reasons for enforcement, one of which is that the parties had 
admitted up front that everyone is benefitting here so that enforcement 
would be equal, socially useful, and morally superior, are lacking.  
Enforcing the deal would then no longer prevent one party from 
enriching itself at another’s expense, no longer save a party from 
reasonable detrimental reliance, and no longer be an equal enforcement 
of a trade of mutual promises.  And there is no reason to think that the 
public’s wealth should be used to force anyone to perform, because there 
probably will be no public benefit resulting.  The requirement of proof of 
an unfair exchange is thus better understood as a direct attack on the 
exchange itself, and the simpler explanation is that duress is a defense 
because it undercuts the consideration, not the assent.
195
 
2. Misrepresentation or Fraud 
Misrepresentation or fraud is similar.  The Restatement authors have 
tried to focus on assent for the purpose of describing when fraud renders 
a contract void: 
If a misrepresentation as to the character or essential terms of a 
proposed contract induces conduct that appears to be a manifestation of 
assent by one who neither knows nor has reasonable opportunity to 
know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract, his 
conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.
196
 
But the focus on assent is only apparent.  Similarly to duress, the 
                                                          
 194. Id. § 176(2); see also id. § 176 cmt. a (“The fairness of the resulting exchange is often a 
critical factor in cases involving threats.”). 
 195. Undue influence, a doctrine related to duress, operates as follows: “If a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by undue influence by the other party, the contract is voidable by 
the victim.”  Id. § 177.  Notice the focus in this doctrine, as in duress, on inducement.  Whether 
influence is undue depends on whether unfair persuasion occurred, and unfair persuasion depends on 
“whether the result was produced by means that seriously impaired the free and competent exercise 
of judgment.”  Id. § 177 cmt b.  The first factor listed by the Restatement in that determination is 
“the unfairness of the resulting bargain.”  Id.  Nevertheless, this doctrine does seem more focused on 
the will of the party than the other contract defenses. 
 196. Id. § 163. 
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lynchpin is inducement by a misrepresentation, which of course 
undercuts inducement by the consideration.  When the rule tries to shift 
to assent, which is not the primary issue, it becomes muddled: What is 
conduct that “appears to be a manifestation of assent”?  How is that 
different than “a manifestation of assent”?  This muddled language 
perhaps survived editing because it did not matter; assent was not at 
issue.  What is wrong with the resulting promise is that inducement itself 
is undercut. 
Other language from the rule indirectly makes the same point.  The 
misrepresentation must be “as to the character or essential terms of the 
proposed contract.”  The proposed contract is an exchange, and its 
character or essential terms are the terms of the exchange.  The comment 
explains that this language attempts to focus on what is called fraud in 
the “factum” rather than, misleadingly, the “inducement.”  The 
distinction is between the exchange itself and something peripheral to it, 
though, as the comments show.  Being mistaken as to the identity of a 
party or the wealth of the other party is not enough; the misrepresentation 
must go to “the very nature of the proposed contract.”
197
  Being induced 
by a false exchange is not being induced by the actual exchange. 
For a voidable contract, the attack on consideration is more obvious, 
though less direct: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by 
either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party 
upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is 
voidable . . . .”
198
  Here again the focus is on inducement,
199
 as in duress, 
and also on reliance,
200
 which is inducement acted upon.  The test also 
focuses on the justification for the reliance.  A misrepresentation also 
must be material, a word which is defined in the Restatement at least as 
undercutting inducement.
201
  As with duress, the manifestation of assent 
continues to exist whether the defense is successful or not; what is 
important is what induced it.  And also as with duress, these elements 
focus on the reasonableness of the prima facie judgment that a promise 
should be enforced.  After an event of fraud occurs, we can no longer be 
sure that enforcement prevents one party from enriching itself at 
another’s expense, or saves a party from reasonable detrimental reliance, 
                                                          
 197. Id. § 163 cmt. a. 
 198. Id. § 164(1). 
 199. Id. § 167. 
 200. Section 168 focuses on the reasonableness of the reliance, but reliance itself is inducement.  
Id. §§ 164 cmt. c, 168. 
 201. Id. § 162(2). 
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and we can no longer believe that the parties have admitted ex ante that 
the mutual promises are equal for purposes of enforcement.  And there is 
no reason to think that the public’s wealth should be used to force 
anyone to perform, because there probably will be no public benefit 
resulting. 
3. Mistake 
For mistake, the same analysis holds.  The Restatement posits mutual 
mistake doctrine thus: 
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect 
on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the 
adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake . . . .
202
 
Unilateral mistake doctrine is similar in relevant ways.
203
   
Mistake’s requirement that the mistake be “as to a basic assumption” 
even more explicitly focuses on the exchange.
204
  Many courts in fact 
require that the mistake go to the “substance of the consideration.”
205
  I 
                                                          
 202. Id. § 152(1). 
 203. The Restatement puts it as follows: 
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on 
which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances 
that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the 
mistake . . . , and (a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract 
would be unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his 
fault caused the mistake. 
Id. § 153. 
 204. Id. § 152(1) (“[B]asic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on 
the agreed exchange of performances . . . .”).   
 205. E.g., Stewart v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 72 A. 741, 744 (Me. 1908) (examining “whether there 
was a mutual mistake materially affecting the substance of that purpose and consideration”).  Later 
courts have used other words to name the same thing, including fundamental, essential, vital, the 
efficient cause, the heart of the bargain, and the nature of the purchase.  Ricks, supra note 86, at 
666–67.  The Restatement (Second) uses “basis of the bargain.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).  But unilateral mistake cases still liberally rely on the phrase “substance 
of the consideration.”  See, e.g., City of Devils Lake v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 
595, 597 (D. N.D. 1980) (applying North Dakota law); Dick Corp. v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 475 
F. Supp. 15, 20 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Burge v. Fid. Bond and Mortg. Co., 648 A.2d 414, 420 (Del. 
1994); Am. Bottling Co. v. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P., C.A. No. 09C–02–134 WCC, 2009 WL 
3290729, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.  Sept. 30, 2009); First Baptist Church of Moultrie v. Barber 
Contracting Co., 377 S.E.2d 717, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); In re Barney, 710 A.2d 408, 411 (N.H. 
1998); Iversen Constr. Corp. v. Palmyra-Macedon Cent. Sch. Dist., 539 N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1989); Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 398 n.3 (R.I. 1970); 
Arcon Constr. Co. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 314 N.W.2d 303, 305 (S.D. 1982).  The phrase was 
criticized in Lenawee Cnty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Mich. 1982).  Here as 
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have discussed this elsewhere; the origin and logic of mutual mistake lie 
in the undercutting of consideration,
206
 or, as the Restatement puts it, “the 
very basis for the contract,”
207
 or, for mutual mistake, “an unexpected 
material imbalance in the exchange.”
208
  What counts as a mistake that 
may warrant relief shows the close relationship between mistake and 
consideration: “Mutual mistake applies to warrant relief (or in other 
words, a factual assumption is found to be basic, essential, etc.) most 
often when the mistake results in present impossibility or 
impracticability of performance, present frustration, or a gross 
undercutting of the equivalence of the parties’ exchange.”
209
  The 
possibility of performing the promise, the promise’s purpose, and its 
value—all of these relate directly to the consideration analysis, to the 
exchange and its value, and none of them to assent.  At most, taking on 
the risk of the mistake by agreement
210
 removes the effect of the mistake; 
the essential, consideration-rebutting elements remain required and must 
be proved for the defense to be successful.  Incidentally, the defenses of 
present impracticability and frustration of purpose are also an 
undercutting of the bargain;
211
 they likewise only indirectly address 
assent but directly attack the exchange itself, either its performance or its 
purpose. 
                                                          
well the Restatement (Second) has moved to “basic assumption.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).  Some courts use merely the less specific word “material.”  E.g., Alaska 
Int’l. Constr., Inc. v. Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc., 697 P.2d 626, 629 (Alaska 1985). 
 206. See Ricks, supra note 86, at 666–72, 694–704, 715–47. 
 207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 cmt. a (1981). 
 208. Id. ch. 6, intro. note.  The distinction between mutual and unilateral mistake is spoken of as 
one of degree—only one party is so disappointed, so the defense of unilateral mistake is “more 
restrictive.”  Id.  However, the defense of unilateral mistake is also contingently dependent on 
whether the contract would be unconscionable, see id. § 153(a), and unconscionability is an even 
more direct attack on consideration.  See infra Part II.B.4. 
 209. Ricks, supra note 86, at 668; see also EDWIN C. MCKEAG, MISTAKE IN CONTRACT: A 
STUDY IN COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 77–84, 124 (1905); GEORGE E. PALMER, MISTAKE AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 35–39 (1962); Roland R. Foulke, Mistake in the Formation and Performance 
of a Contract, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 197, 221–23 (1911); Edward H. Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter 
Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1288–91 
(1967).  The Restatement (Second) agrees, though the statement of it is somewhat hard to trace.  See 
Ricks, supra note 86, at 670 n.34. 
 210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) (1981). 
 211. These defenses were in place by around 1800 both in Britain and the United States but in 
the form of action for money had and received for failure of consideration.  See Ricks, supra note 
86, at 704 n.206. 
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4. Unconscionability 
The relationship between unconscionability and consideration should 
be obvious.  Unconscionability is commonly analyzed as both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability, i.e., bargaining naughtiness and a hard 
bargain.  These signify problems with a supposedly bargained-for 
promise and consideration and, if proved, reverse whatever presumptions 
of policy consideration might carry with it.  The doctrine of 
unconscionability is a direct attack on the exchange itself. 
Though unconscionability doctrine relies in part on “bargaining 
naughtiness” or “procedural unconscionability,” the sine qua non of 
unconscionability in the U.S. has traditionally been substantive 
unconscionability—that the exchange is not on fair terms.
212
  Courts 
sometimes suggest that substantive unconscionability is relevant because 
                                                          
 212. Nearly all courts agree that substantive unconscionability—meaning an unfair bargain—is 
necessary.  I am not going to cite all courts here, but in support please consider the following: 
PERILLO, supra note 8, § 9.40; 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 18.10 (“[S]urprise or an 
inability to bargain with understanding as to the terms of an agreement (procedural unfairness) must 
culminate in the drafting party’s exacting harsh or unreasonable terms from the other party 
(substantive unfairness) before the concept of unconscionability becomes applicable in the view of 
perhaps most jurisdictions.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 4.28.  I have been clocking 
unconscionability cases for a number of years and not found one yet that granted relief without a 
harsh bargain.  This is by far the express majority position.  I would be very interested to be proved 
wrong as to whether or not such a case exists, however.  Farnsworth oddly says that if “procedural 
unconscionability alone rises to the level of misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence . . . the 
contract may be voidable without regard to substantive unconscionability.”  Id.  But if those defenses 
actually are proved, then the contract is voidable without regard to unconscionability at all, in any of 
its facets.  Actual cases invalidating contract terms for procedural unconscionability may exist.  See, 
e.g., E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 717 (Miss. 2002) (hat tip to Professor Lonegrass for the 
citation, though the case is not entirely clear: the court did recite the plaintiff’s arguments and the 
trial court’s analysis that the clause at issue was also substantively unconscionable).  But these are so 
rare as to be anomalies: “[V]ery few courts have actually invalidated contracts on the basis of purely 
procedural defects,” Lonegrass notes, supra note 7, at 21, even though some courts now profess to 
be willing to grant relief on that basis if procedural unconscionability looks bad enough.  Id. at 6 
n.24.  Professor Knapp, in a recent paper, suggests that “there are instances of a court going even 
beyond the ‘sliding scale’ approach, to find unconscionability of a contract or term based entirely on 
only one of the two prongs, with little or no attention paid to the other one.”  Charles L. Knapp, 
Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-first Century Survey, UC Hastings College 
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 71, 14 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346498.  It is true that courts say this occurs, 
see for example infra note 214, but no case I know of allows an unconscionability remedy to rest 
entirely on the procedural side.  Cases supporting Knapp’s assertion on the procedural side are not 
apparent in his discussion.  Knapp cites Iron Dynamics v. Alstom Power, Inc., 64 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 201 (N.D. Ind. 2007), but that case rejected an argument solely based on procedural 
unconscionability.  See id.  The cases I know of granting relief relying only on one prong rest on 
substance.  E.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59–60 (Ariz. 1995); Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (N.Y. App. Div.  1998) (a class action).  
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it shows lack of assent,
213
 but if that were true then procedural 
unconscionability alone should warrant relief, and it does not.
214
  The 
language of the UCC also presumes that substantive unconscionability 
alone will warrant relief.
215
  A requirement of substantive 
unconscionability is precisely what one would expect if 
unconscionability were an argument primarily against a bargain and not 
against assent alone.  The simpler explanation of the unconscionability 
defense is that substantive unconscionability is required because the 
doctrine is not an attack on assent but on consideration. 
Unconscionability as a defense may slowly move away from its 
dependency on a finding of a hard bargain.
216
  This would throw the logic 
of the formation defenses into some disarray.  What need would we have 
of duress, fraud, or mistake if something like but less than any of these—
without any hard bargain at all—would render a contract voidable?  On 
the other hand, it matters very little which defense we use if all of them 
are a re-examination of the bargain. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
Each of the formation defenses arose before we had assent doctrines.  
At the time, a prima facie case was made out by showing promise, 
consideration, and breach.  The defenses do not show that no promise 
was made, or that breach did not occur.  They were instead aimed at 
taking away the consideration, or that which made consideration an 
element of a prima facie case.  Consideration, with the promise, was the 
ground for the action.  The defenses still function the same way today.  
The suggestion that assent is all that is at issue here may make one feel 
relatively contemporary, but it fails to explain why contract defenses 
defend, just as it fails to explain why we hang onto the consideration 
doctrine after four-and-a-half centuries. 
Understanding consideration’s role in justifying the formation 
                                                          
 213. See, e.g., Lonegrass, supra note 7, at 22–25 (reporting judicial opinions). 
 214. The Maxwell case from Arizona, Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995), 
asserted that some courts hold either procedural or substantive unconscionability alone to be 
sufficient.  Id. at 58 & n.3.  But every case cited by that court to prove the point held on substantive 
unconscionability alone, not procedural.  See also supra note 212. 
 215. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made . . . .”); id. § 2-719(3) (naming a clause 
which the code declares “prima facie unconscionable” without any reference to procedural matters); 
see also Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 59 (accepting this argument). 
 216. See the judicial language addressing this issue at Lonegrass, supra note 7, at 6 n.24. 
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defenses should influence the way contract law is litigated, taught, and 
theorized.  What was true with regard to consideration’s role in 
formation elements
217
 is true for consideration’s role in formation 
defenses.  As discussed in Assent Is Not an Element of Contract 
Formation, focusing on consideration emphasizes that what is at issue in 
each breach of contract case is the enforcement of a promise.  Belying 
our loose talk about agreement and assent, the contract formation 
doctrines themselves, when they function, operate almost exclusively on 
a promise, consideration for that promise, and defenses which undercut 
that consideration.
218
  All the doctrines address the enforceability of one 
single promise at a time, not an agreement.  Consideration is still the 
touchstone of promise enforcement, because it contains the plaintiff’s 
policy statement supporting why the law should in the first place take 
any account of the defendant’s promise and breach.  When students learn 
contract formation, they will therefore understand best how the doctrines 
fit together and how they function if the students study promise and 
consideration first.  Finally, theory that grounds the formation defenses 
solely on assent will miss the point.  The defenses address more than 
assent; they address the consideration. 
 
                                                          
 217. See Ricks, supra note 1, Part IV.B. 
 218. Id. at 653–55. 
